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That is "measured" in which [quality and quantity] are so unified 
that neither can be altered without altering the other.' 
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the theory of Measure^ that is set forth in the 
seventh through ninth ehapters of Hegel's monumental Science of 
Logic.^ Measure is the third final province in the kingdom of Quality, 
whieh itself comprises the first kingdom in the tripartite empire of the 
Science of Logic. When Measure concludes, we will have arrived at the 
portal of the negative, correlative underworld of shadowy Essence. 
Hegel proclaims the development of Measure to be "extremely 
difficult." (331)"^ Many commentators have concurred.^ We can 
' G.R.G. MURE, THE PHN:.osoPHY OF HEGEL 116 (1965). 
2 Capitalization loosely signifies that the term in question has an official place in Hegel's 
Logic. Pictographic diagrams for every step of the Logic (through the end of Measure) can be 
found in the appendix. The beginning of the appendix describes how these diagrams are to be 
read. 
3 All numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers fi-om GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S 
SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans. 1969). Volume number and page numbers in brackets 
refer to G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK (1975). I have also omitted ellipses at the 
end of any quoted phrase. An ellipsis signals that a sentence does not end with the quoted words. 
Hegel's sentences, however, never end, and so ellipses convey no useful information. 
^ "[E]ine der schwierigsten Materien." [1: 340]. This has been found "a particularly 
significant observation, since such modesty is not often encountered in his writings." Louik 
Fleischhacker, Hege! on Mathematics and Experimental Science, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 
209, 211 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).Cinzia Ferrini finds in this remark, added to the 1831 
version of the Science of Logic, a complex story involving Hegel's renunciation of his notorious 
early dissertation, De Orbitis Planetarum, where he deduced from Logic the ratio of the distances 
between planets. Ferrini notes that Hegel simply renounced this conclusion in the 1817 
"Heidelberg" Encyclopedia, and then omitted the renunciation in the later Berlin editions. The 
Heidelberg version was based on a "single" transition from Quality to Quantity, and a "single" 
transition back. In this' single transition, only vanishing was emphasized. Hence, Hegel could 
flatly renounce De Orbitis. But in the 1827 and 1830 Berlin editions of the Encycolpedia, Hegel 
realized that there was a "double" transition, which 1 have described elsewhere. David Gray 
Carlson, Hegel's neory of Quantity, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2147-48 (2002) [hereinafter 
Carlson, Quantity^ In the double transition, each side of the syllogism vanishes and sustains 
itself. This leads Hegel to withdraw his renunciation of his earlier work, since empirical quanta 
are not entirely unrelated to Logic. Cinzia Ferrini, Framing Hypotheses: Numbers in Nature and 
the Logic of Measure in the Development of Hegel's System, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE 283 (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998) [hereinafter Ferrini, Framing]-, Cinzia Ferrini, Logica 
efilosofia della natura nella dottrina dell'essere hegeliana (I) 1991 RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA 
FILOSOFIA 701; Cinzia Ferrini, Logica e fdosofia della natura nella dottrina dell'essere 
hegeliana (II) 1992 RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA ILOSOFIA 103. On Hegel's notorious dissertation, 
see Olivier Depre. The Ontological Foundations of Hegel's Dissertation oflSOI, in id. at 257. 
5 Errol Harris judges Measure to be "extraordinarily difficult... so obscure as to be, for the 
most part, hardly intelligible, and, while it contains some astonishingly prescient scientific 
comments, it also indulges in what, to us in the twentieth century, must appear ill-informed and 
perverse polemic against sound scientific insights." ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF 
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nevertheless describe the theme of Measure easily enough—change; 
more precisely, an exploration of the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative change. 
Change has itself changed over our logical joumey. At first, 
change was transition. Being became Nothing. Determinate Being 
became Negation. The Finite ceased to be. Starting with the True 
Infinite, however, change itself changed. The True Infinite did not 
cease to be. It stayed what it was even while it became something 
different. This was the beginning of ideality. In True Infinity, 
immediate Being ceased to be and preserved itself in an idealized form. 
When Being ceased to be (while surviving as the mere memory of 
immediacy), we entered the realm of Quantity, which was Being with 
all its content outside of itself. Whatever Quantity is, it is by virtue of 
outside force designating what it is. Quantity is open to mere 
quantitative change. Quantitative change is change imposed from the 
outside. The very quality of Quantum was that it was open (and 
therefore) indifferent to change imposed upon it from the outside. 
Qualitative change is self-imposed change from the inside. We 
will learn, however, that genuine qualitative change depends on 
quantitative change. Nature does make great leaps, but only after nature 
indifferently undergoes incremental quantitative change.^ Liquid water, 
as it gets colder due to outside force, indifferently stays liquid, but, at 0° 
centigrade, liquid, radically and all at once, becomes a solid. 
Measure emerged in the Ratio of Powers {e.g., = y), which 
showed itself to be "self-related externality." (327)'' In = y, the 
identity of the first (internal) x is determined by the second (external) x. 
Hence, the first x is in the thrall of externality. Nevertheless, x = x, and 
so it is self-related, even while externally determined. As self-related, 
the Ratio of Powers (which we may now call Measure) is "a sublated 
externality." (327)^ Under the law of sublation,^ externality is canceled 
and preserved. Hence, Measure "has within itself the difference from 
itself." (327)'o 
When difference was simply external, we had before us 
quantitative difference. But now, having been captured by Measure, 
this difference is a qualitative moment. The quantitative report of a 
THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 143 (1983). 
^ For this reason, "a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch 
hold of the quality ... "GEORG W.F. KEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 108 Remark (William Wallace 
trans., 1975) [hereinafter LESSER LOGIC]. 
7 "[Sjelbst beziehende AuBerlichkeit." [1:336]. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 
2145-48. By "ratio" Hegel means any relation between two quanta, including Aiy, x', orx/y. 
8 "[AJufgehobene Ax&er\ictilse\i." [1: 336]. 
9 On sublation, see David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 
425, 452 (2001) [hereinafter Carlson, Quality], 
'9 "[H]at an ihr selbst den Untershied von sich." [1: 336]. 
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Measure is the thing's own authentic report of itself." When the mode 
is external but essential, Measure is before us. As John Burbidge 
remarks: 
Measuring. . . introduces an explicit act of relating. It brings 
together two realities, indifferent to each other. This conjunction is 
recognized as valid, however, only if each term allows for, and 
indeed encourages, the assoeiation. Since mutual reference is now an 
inherent characteristic of the concept, one passes beyond simple 
immediacy.'^ 
Essence. Measures are brought together by an external measurer. 
Nevertheless, the Measures are ready to be brought together. Measure 
therefore is, as Hegel will later say, "the immanent quantitative 
relationship of two qualities to each other." (340)" Each Measure, 
however, imposes quantitative change on the other Measure. Each 
Measure has a qualitative resilience against the change imposed upon it 
from the outside. If this resilience is isolated and considered on its own, 
we have the Measureless—or Essence. Hegel now provides his first 
definition of Essence—"to be self-identical in the immediacy of its 
determined being." (329)"' In the realm of Essence, things mediate 
themselves. They are not mediated by outside forces. Self-mediation is 
called "reflection." (330) 
Though beyond Measure, Essence is nevertheless "already 
immanent in measure." (329)" But self-mediation (reflection) is still 
only implicit." The Determinations of Reflection are destined to enjoy 
a self-subsistence and independence from the qualitative and the 
quantitative. 
• 1 As one commentator puts it: 
In the Hegelian system, the quantities involved in measurement, which from an 
epistemological point of view are a means to cognition, are ontologized and treated as 
natural objects, that is to say as the objects of an overriding analytical cognition. What 
is more, the equalities in behaviour constituting the substance or content of the 
quantities meastu-ed are interpreted as being things. As a result, the natural world as 
determined by Hegel corresponds to the view of nature developed by mechanicism, the 
world-view of the mechanistically-minded popularizers of natural science. 
Renate Wahsner, The Philosophical Background to Hcgcl's Criticism of Newton, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONTANISM, supra note 4, at 81, 83. 
12 JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 63 (I98I). In 
his later book on chemistry, however, Burbidge less plausibly remarks: "Measuring uses a 
quantity to specify a quality. That definition sets the logical task." JOHN W. BURBIDGE, REAL 
PROCESS: HOW LOGIC AND CHEMISTRY COMBINE IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 53 
(1996). This formulation threatens to obscure the fact that, for Hegel, a Measure's quality is its 
quantity—accurate reportage of what the thing is. 
13 "Das Mafi ist so das immanente quantitative verhalten zweier Qualitaten zueinander." 
[1:350]. 
I'l "[I]n der Unmittelbarkeit des bestimmtseins identisch." [1:339]. 
15 "Es liegt in dem MaBe bereits." [1:339]. 
16 "Determinations of Reflection" (Reflexionbestimung) is the subject of the eleventh chapter 
in the SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 
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For the moment, Quality and Quantity are still with us, but in 
mediated form. Each of these extremes in the syllogism of Measure is 
equally the one and the other. This was not so before. In Quality, the 
Understanding (i.e. the prepositional logic of what is) grasped Being as 
an affirmative immediacy. In Quantity, the Understanding learned that 
the negative, quantitative moment of Continuity was the truth of Being. 
Now the Understanding sees that the qualitative and the quantitative are 
two houses both alike in dignity. The difference between them is 
"indifference and so is no difference." (330)'^ The difference between 
Quality and Quantity has been sublated. In Ratio, Quantity showed 
itself to be a retum-into-self to extemal, merely quantitative change. 
This very reflection-into-self is Quality. It is not mere Being-for-self 
(which self-destructed and became nothing). Rather, this form of 
Being—^reflection-into-self—is "being-in-and-for-self—the attribute of 
Essence. (330)'^ Thus, Hegel introduces in Measure the portentous new 
brand of substance—^being-in-and-for-self. 
Being-in-and-for-self, however, is merely implicit in Measure. 
"Measure, still as such is itself the immediate [seiende] unity of quality 
and quantity; its moments are determinately present as a quality, and 
quanta thereof." (330)'^ Immediate Measure is actually a mediation of 
qualitative and quantitative moments. Measure will be revealed as 
always a ratio of Measures. Within the ratio, each side will further 
reveal itself to be a "ratio of specific quanta having the form of self-
subsistent measures from each other" (330)^0 yielding an infinite 
regression or "bad infinity." The sides of every ratio have mere 
quantitative difference. This implies that each measure continues into 
the other, and therefore beyond itself entirely. The name of this passage 
into the beyond is the Measureless. 
The Measureless is the negativity of Measure, but only in 
principle. The indifference of the determinations of Measure to their 
negative "Measureless" soul must be demonstrated. This is the final 
result of Real Measure.^* Real Measure is "real through the negativity 
contained in the indifference." (330)^^ It is "an inverse ratio of 
measures." (330)^^ In this Ratio, which must remain largely mysterious 
"[D]er Unterschied ist als gleichgultig." [1:339]. 
"[D]as An- undFiirsichsein." [I: 339]. 
1' "Das MaC noch als solches ist selbst die seiende Einheit des Quaiitativen und 
Quantitativen; seine Momente sind ais ein Dasein, eine Quaiitat und Quanta derseiben." [1:339]. 
20 "Verhaitnis von spezifischen Quantis ais seibstandigen iVlaBen." [i :340]. 
21 "Real," for Hegei, tends to be a diaiecticai word, denoting a determinateness. See JOHN W. 
BURBIDGE, HEGEL ON LOGIC AND RELIGION: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 44 
(1992) RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, AUTONOMY AND NORMATTVITY 50 (2001) ("reality is the 
determinacy something in virtue of its contrast to something else"). Here, Real Measure is the 
second, "dialectical" chapter of Measure. 
22 "[R]eell mit der in ihr enthaltenen Negativitat." [ 1:340]. 
23 "[U]mgekehrtes Verhaitnis von MaBen." [1:340]. 
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until the third chapter of Measure,the extremes of the syllogism show 
themselves to be self-subsistent—indifferent to their negative soul. 
Because they are so, the Measures are only quantitatively related and 
qualitatively distinct. They can dispense with their negative unity 
entirely. That is, the Qualitative Measures retreat within themselves 
and shed their true content—Essence, "which is their reflection-into-
self." (331)25 At this point, externality has sublated itself, and Being's 
journey draws to a close. 
Measure and the social sciences. Because Measure entails 
external imposition upon a phenomenon that is partly free and 
independent of outside oppression, Hegel is able to set forth a kind of 
hierarchy in the natural sciences in terms of conduciveness to Measure. 
"The complete, abstract indifference of developed measure ... can only 
be manifested in the sphere of mechanics'''' wherein matter is abstract. 
(331)26 In the inorganic and even more in the organic spheres. Measure 
is "subordinated to higher relationships." (332)22 The free development 
of Measure according to logic is still less to be found in politics or 
constitutional law—"the realm of spirit." (332)28 ^^^y be that the 
Athenian constitution is suited only to city-states, "but all this yields 
neither laws of measure nor characteristic forms of it." (332)2^ In this 
sphere "there occur differences of intensity of character, strength of 
imagination, sensations, general ideas, and so on." (331)5o The 
"measure" of such phenomena never goes "beyond the indefmiteness of 
strength or weakness.'''' (332)5^ Ordinal, not cardinal, measures are the 
most political science can expect to achieve. 
Hegel terminates his introduction to Measure with a blast at 
empirical psychology—of late quite the fashion in American law 
reviews:52 "[h]ow insipid and completely empty the so-called laws turn 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 317-405. 
25 "[wjelche ihre Reflexion-in-sich ... ist." [1:340]. 
26 "Die vollstandige, abstrakte Gleichgiiltigkeit des entwickelten Mafles ... kann nur in der 
Sphare des Mechanismus statthaben." [1:341]. 
27 "[H]6hem Verhaltnissen untergeordnet." [1:341]. Professor Ferrini suggests that these 
observations were designed to answer Goethe, who questioned the propriety of measiuang organic 
processes. She reads Hegel as not entirely rejecting measures of organic life, in the nature of 
Goethe, but conceding the limitations of doing so. Cinzia Ferrini, On the Relation Between 
"Mode" and "Measure" in Hegel's Science of Logic: Some Introductory Remarks, 20 OWL OF 
MINERVA 20, 47-48 (1988) [hereinafter Ferrini, Mode and Measure], 
28 "[I]m Reich des Geistes." [1:342]. 
29 "[A]ber dies gibt weder Gesetze von Mafien noch eigentiimliche Formen desselben." 
[1:342]. 
50 "Im Geistigen als solchem kommen Unterschiede von Intensitaat des Charakters, Starke 
der Einbildungskraft, der Empfmdtmgen, der Vorstellungen usf." [1:342]. 
51 "[A]ber fiber dis Unbestimmte der Starke oder Schwache geht die Bestimmung nicht 
hinaus." [1:342]. 
52 For a critical view of this fashion, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too 
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 1907 (2002). 
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out to be which have been laid down about the relation of strength and 
weakness of sensations, general ideas and so on, comes home to one on 
reading the psychologies which occupy themselves with such laws." 
(332)33 
Hegel, I think, objects to empirical psychology because it proposes 
to reduce human freedom to a set of inviolable laws. Any such attempt 
to measure freedom is what Hegel attacks elsewhere as mere 
phrenology.3'* 
Modality. Before proceeding on to Specific Quantity—Hegel's 
first chapter on Measure—1 would like to backtrack and discuss Hegel's 
treatment, early in his introductory essay, of a topic seemingly unrelated 
to physical measurement—Kant's notion of modality. At the beginning 
of the Science of Logic, Hegel writes: 
Measure can also, if one wishes, be regarded as a modality; but since 
with Kant modality is supposed no longer to constitute a 
determination of the content, but to concem only the relation of the 
content to thought, to the element, it is a quite heterogeneous 
relation.... (80)33 
This passage in effect accuses Kant of believing that thought has 
no effect on the object measured.36 Hegel now elaborates on this 
criticism.3'7 Modality—^where thought meets object—is the "sphere of 
33 "Wie matt und vollig leer die sogenannten Gesetze ausfallen,die fiber das Verhaltnis von 
Starke imd Schwache der Empfindimgen, Vostellungen usf. auggestellt werden, wird man inne, 
weim man die Psychologien nachsieht, welche sich mit dergleichen bemilhen." [1:342], 
Kant joins in the condemnation: 
If we took principles from psychology, i.e. from observations about ottr understanding . 
. . this would therefore lead to the cognition of merely contingent laws. In logic, 
however, the question is not one of contingent but of necessary laws. 
IMMANUEL KANT, LOGIC 16 (Robert S. Hartman & Wolfgang Schwarz trans., 1974). 
34 GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT TI309 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) 
[hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY]. On social science's hatred of freedom, see Jeatme L. Schroeder, 
The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
263 (2002). 
35 "Das Mafi kann auch fur eine Modalitat, wenn man will, angesehen werden; aber indem bei 
Kant diese nicht mehr eine Bestimmung des Inhalt ausmachen, sondem nur die Beziehtmg 
desselben auf das Denken, auf das Subjektive, angehen soil, so ist dies eine ganz heterogene ... 
Beziehtmg." [1:65]. 
36 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 142 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) 
(the categories of modality do not determine the object, but only express its relation to the faculty 
of cognition). 
37 It has been suggested that Hegel's identification of modality as a form of measure 
constitutes "the essence of Hegel's response to the challenge of the way in which transcendental 
idealism treated determinate being." Ferrini, Mode and Measure, supra note 27, at 40. Professor 
Ferrini notes that most commentators view the discussion of modality to be a digression that has 
nothing to do with Measure, a position she criticizes. E.g., HARRIS, supra note 5, at 144. Harris, 
however, vindicates himself by pointing out that Hegel's remarks here "serve to show that 
Measure in the Doetrine of Being is really an inchoate disclosure of the relation between 
imiversal and particular," id., a relation Hegel will address directly in the Subjective Logic many 
chapters hence. 
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coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be." (329)^^ By this, Hegel means to 
comment on Kant's notion that the gap between subject and object is 
unbridgeable. Hence, subjectivity "ceases to be" in the thing-in-itself. 
And the thing-in-itself "ceases to be" in subjective experience. In 
Hegel's opinion, objects "come to be" in the measure of thought.^^ 
Kantian modality is faulted for not being Measure to the extent thought 
leaves the object unaffected.'^" 
For Kant, modality, fourth in his famous table of categories,'^' is 
the choice of possibility or impossibility, existence or non-existence, 
necessity or contingency. In his table, Kant leads with "quantity" and 
"quality"—a priority Hegel reverses.''^ For Kant, quantity comes first. 
Within quantity, "unity" stands over against "plurality." The unity of 
unity and plurality is "totality." Quality is second. Within Quality, 
Kant opposes reality to negation; their unity is limitation. The triplicity 
that Hegel so much favored is confined within a given category. But no 
triplicity inheres between quantity, quality, relation and modality. For 
this very reason, Hegel writes, Kant "was unable to hit on the third to 
quality and quantity." (327)"^ 
Hegel implies that "modality" was Kant's true third. If so, then we 
can see why Hegel equates modality with Measure. "Relation"—Kant's 
nominal third—is dismissed as merely an "insertion." (327)'''' Kantian 
38 "[D]ie Sphare des Entstehens und Vergehens." [1:338], 
39 See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 522. 
'•0 Ferrini, Mode and Measure, supra note 27, at 43. 
41 Kant's categories are as follows: 
I. II. 






Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et aceidens) 
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) 






CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 36, at 62. 
42 Earlier, we saw Hegel advertising the wisdom of beginning with Quality and deriving 
Quantity therefrom. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 44, at 2030-31; see also Science of Logic, 
supra note 3, at 79 ("hitherto the determination of quantity has been made to precede quality and 
this ... for no given reason"); ("der Quantitdt vor der Qualitdt aufgefurt wird ... ohne weitem 
Grund")[I:64]. 
43 "[D]aher hat er nicht auf das Dritte der Qualitat und Quantitat kommen kdnnen." [1:337]. 
44 "Einshiebung." [1:336]. Gadamer suggests that Relation in Kant corresponds to Essence in 
Hegel's Logic. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES 
81 (Christopher Smith trans., 1976). 
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modality, Hegel says, is "the relation of the object to thought." 
Kant perceived thought as entirely external to the thing-in-itself. The 
first three categories belong to thought alone—though to the objective 
quality of thought. Modality involves the relation of thought to object. 
It contains the determination of reflection-into-self, meaning that, by 
encountering objects, modality renders the objects into thoughts and 
brings them under the jurisdiction of the mind. This signifies that the 
objectivity common to the other categories is lacking in modality. The 
modalities—^possibility, existence and necessity—do not add to the 
determination of the object. They only express the relation of the object 
to the faculty of cognition. In short, for Kant, thought leaves the object 
unaffected. 
For Spinoza, "mode" was third after substance and attribute. Mode 
was the "affections"—i.e., affectations—of substance: "that element 
which is in an other through which it is comprehended." (327)"^^ 
Accordingly, mode for Spinoza is "externality as such." (327)'^^ 
Because "mode" is external, it is the untrue. Mode, then, is "the non-
substantial generally, which can only be grasped through an other." 
(328)"^® Modal being for Spinoza is precisely what does not endure. 
When the modal thought of substance disappears (back into substance), 
nothing of mode remains. As Hyppolite puts it, Spinoza "failed to see 
that if every determination is a negation, that negation is genuinely 
expressed (fbr-itself and no longer only in-itself) only in the mode .. . 
"49 
The Hindus had a similar triune organization, leading to 
comparisons with Christianity, but, Hegel insists, the comparison is 
misleading. In Hindu religion, the unity of Brahma disperses but does 
not return. The supreme goal is "submergence in unconsciousness, 
unity with Brahma, annihilation." (329)^" But in Christianity, "there is 
"[D]ie Beziehwig des Geyenstand auf das Denken." [1:336]. See Ferrini, Mode and 
Measure, supra note 27, at 36 ("[F]or Kant, modality was concerned solely with the meaning of 
the verb "to be," as is used in order to indicate or establish a connection between an object and a 
proposition, and this use had to be based upon the faculty of cognition in that the modality is 
understood as de re and not de dicto"). 
46 "[D]ie Affektionen der Substanz oder fur dasjenige, was in einem Andem ist, durch 
welches es auch begriffen wird." [1:227]. 
47 "[D]ie AuPerlichkeit als solche." [1:327]. 
48 "[D]as Nichtsubstantielle uberhaupt, das nur aus einem Andem gefafit werden kann." 
[1:337]. See 1 HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING THE 
LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING 370-99 (1934). 
49 JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 106 
(Samuel Chemiak & John Heckman trans., 1974). On Hegel's personal history with Spinozism, 
see Hans-Christian Lucas, Spinoza, Hegel, Whitehead: Substance, Subject and Superject, in 
HEGEL AND WHITEHEAD: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 39 
(George R. Lucas, Jr., ed. 1986). 
50 "[D]ie Versenkung in die BewuBtlosigkeit, die Einheit mit Brahm, die Vemichtung." 
[1:338]. 
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not only unity but union, the conclusion of the syllogism [which] is a 
unity possessing content and actuality, a unity which in its wholly 
concrete determination is spirit." (328)^' 
Like the Brahmans, Spinoza does not manage retum-into-self. The 
mode is external and untrue. Truth lies only in substance. "But this is 
only to submerge all content in the void, in a merely formal unity 
lacking all content," Hegel complains. (328)^2 
In Spinoza's thought, the mode is abstract extemality, "indifferent 
to qualitative and quantitative determinations." (329)^^ These 
"unessential elements are not supposed to count," but, nevertheless, 
"everything depends on the kind and maimer of the mode." (329)^"* This 
dependence is a confession that the mode belongs to the essential nature 
of a thing—"a very indefinite connection but one which at least implies 
that this external element is not so abstractly an extemality." (329)^^ 
1. SPECIFIC QUANTITY 
A. The Specific Quantum 
At the end of Quantity, the Ratio of Powers was "the simple 
relation of the quantum to itself, its own determinateness within itself." 
(333)^^ In short. Quantity had recaptured its Quality, conceived as 
Ratio's immunity from outside manipulation. 
Our first step is Immediate Measure: 
51 "In der wahrhaften Dreiheit ist nicht nur Einheit, sondem Einigkeit, der SchluB zur 
inhaltsvollen und wirklichen Einheit, die in ihrer ganz konkreten Bestimmung der Geist ist, 
gebracht." [1:338]. 
52 "[W]elches dann ein Versenken alles Inhalts in die Leerheit, in nur formelle, inhaltlose 
Einheit ist." [1:338]. 
53 "[D]ie Gleichgilltigheit gegen die qualitativen wie gegen die quantitativen Bestimmungen." 
[1:338]. 
54 "[Das] Unwesentliche nicht ankommen soil, so wird auch wieder in vielem zugestanden, 
daB alles auf die Art und Weise ankomme." [1:338]. The Greeks get better marks. They taught 
that "everything has a measure." (329) ("[D]aB alles ein MaB hat." [1:338]). This was "the 
beginning of a much higher conception than that contained in substance and in the difference of 
the mode from the substance." (329) ("[D]er Anfang eines viel hohem Begriffs, als die Substanz 
und der Unterschied des Modus von derselben enhalt." [1:339]). 
55 "[l]n welcher sehr unbestimmten Beziehung wenigstens dies liegt, daB dies AuBerliche 
nicht so abstrakt das AuBerliche sei." [1:338]. 
56 "[D]ie einfache Beziehung des Quantums auf sich, seine eigene Bestimmheit an sich 
selbst." [1:343]. This was one side of the matter. The Ratio of Powers was equally "self-related 
extemality." (327) That is, in the ratio = y, where y is fixed, x is self-determined, but it still 
needs that other (external) x to complete its determination. 




Immediate measure in Figure 18(a) [1,2] is "an immediate 
quantum, hence just some specific quantum or other," but it is equally 
an immediate quality, "some specific quality or other." (333)^^ It is 
therefore appropriate to represent the mediated nature of Immediate 
Measure as a dialectic moment: 
The side of Quantum [1] is not indifferent to [2, 3] but is "a self-
related externality" and hence a Quality (333).^^ For this reason, it is 
shown on the left side of the page, which is to be taken is the side of 
Being. 
Why Immediate Measure, taken as a mediation between quantity 
and quality, is a self-relation should by now be apparent. [2] represents 
the mediation between [1] and [3], and it is the very being-within-self of 
the concept of Measure. But why is this self-relation an externality? 
The answer lies in the True Infinite nature of Measure. True Infinimde 
requires that [1] go out of itself and into [2], which, as always, instantly 
implies that [2] is an externality represented by [3]. Hence, the 
externality of Immediate Measure is both inside and outside—[2] and 
[3]. Accordingly, Hegel says of the Quanmm [1] that it is distinguished 
See the appendix for a descrption of what this drawing means. 
58 "[E]in unmittelbares, daher als irgendein bestimmtes Quantum ... sie ist irgendeine 
bestimmte Qualitat." [1:343]. 
59 "[S]elbst beziehende AuBerlichkeit." [1:336]. 
Figure 18(b) 
Mediated Immediate Measure 
140 C A R D O Z O  L A  W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 25:1 
from Quality, but "does not transcend it, neither does the quality 
transcend the quantum. It is thus the determinateness which has 
retumed into simple identity with itself." (333)^" 
The metaphysical proposition that these last two logical steps 
represent is that "all that exists has a measure" (333),6i the proposition 
of the Pythagoreans.^^ Quantum, then, "belongs to the nature of the 
something itself." (333)« Quantum is inherent in Being—its being-
within-self. Accordingly, Being is not indifferent to its magnitude. I 
its magnitude is altered, the quality of the thing in question alters as 
well. Hence, "Quantum, as measure, has ceased to be a limit which is 
not limit; it is now the determination of the thing, which is destroyed if 
it is increased or diminished beyond this quantum. (333-34)^ 
A measured thing exhibits a degree of resilience. It remains what 
it is even though its quantum is changed. But eventually there comes a 
dramatic moment when the measured thing becomes qualitatively 
different. The example of water has already been given.^^ Water has a 
liquid quality over a range of temperatures. But if we lower the 
quantitative side of water's Measure to below zero degrees centigrade, 
water undergoes a sudden cataclysmic change. It turns into ice, which 
is qualitatively different from liquid water. 
Quantitative determinateness, then, has a double nature. It is (1) 
"that to which the quality is tied" and also (2) "that which can be varied 
without affecting the quality." (334)^6 immediate Measure brings forth 
both moments—the idea that quantitative change destroys the quality of 
a being and the idea that quality is indifference to quantitative change. 
This prior point proves that "the destruction of anything which has a 
measure takes place through the alteration of its quantum.' (334-35)^'' 
It likewise proves that not every quantitative change is a qualitative 
change. . 
The idea of quantitative change that results in qualitative change is 
captured by the common sense notion of gradualness. Suppose we 
lower the temperature of water with a view of destroying its quality as 
liquid (i.e., we make some ice cubes). 
60 "[E]s nicht tlber sie hinaus, so wie diese nicht uber dasselbe hinausgeht. Es ist so in le 
einfache Gleichheit mil sich zuruckgekehrte Bestimmtheit." [1:343]. 
61 "Alles, was da ist, hat ein MaB." [1:343], 
62 CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 111 (1996). 
63 "[G]eh6rtzueNatur von Etwasselbst." [1:343]. 
64 "Das Quantum hat als MaB aufgehort, Grenze zu sein, die keine ist; es ist nunmehr die 
Bestimmung der Sache, so daB diese, Uber dies Quantum vermehrt oder vermmdert, zugrunde 
ginge." [1:343]. 
65 fee rapra text accompanying note 6. . . , . u- a 
66 "[A]n welche dies Qualitat gebunden ist... an der unbeschadet jener bin- und 
hergeaanden werden kaim" [1:344]. • r\ » 
67 "[S]o geschieht das Untergehen von etwas, das ein MaB hat, dann, daB sem Quantem 
verandert wird." [1:344]. 
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On the one hand this destraction appears as unexpected, in so far as 
the quantum can be changed without altering the measure and the 
quality of the thing; but on the other hand, it is made into something 
quite easy to understand through the idea of gradualness. The 
reason why such ready use is made of this category to render 
conceivable or to explain the disappearance of a quality or of 
something, is that it seems to make it possible almost to watch the 
disappearing with one's eyes, because quantum is posited as the 
external limit which is by its nature alterable, and so alteration of 
(quantum only) requires no explanation. But in fact nothing is 
explained thereby; the alteration is ... essentially the transition of 
one quality into another, or the more abstract transition of an 
existence into a negation of the existence; this implies another 
determination than that of gradualness which is only a decrease or an 
increase and is a one-sided holding fast to quantity. (335)^^ 
In short, incremental change is simply easier to accept as a 
psychological matter, eompared to radical qualitative change. Behind 
every incrementalist strategy, however, lies the radical program of 
obliterating what exists and installing something new. 
Hegel asks: 
[DJoes the pulling out of a single hair from the head. . . produce 
baldness, or does a heap cease to be a heap if a grain is removed? 
An answer in the negative can be given without hesitation since such 
a removal constitutes only a quantitative difference, a difference 
moreover which is itself quite insignificant; thus a hair, a grain, is 
removed and this is repeated, only one of them being removed each 
time in accordance with the answer given. At last the qualitative 
change is revealed; the head ... is bald, the heap has disappeared. In 
giving the said answer, what was forgotten was not only the 
repetition, but the fact that the individually insignificant quantities 
(like the individually insignificant disbursements from a fortune) add 
up and the total constitutes the qualitative whole, so that finally this 
whole has vanished; the head is bald, the purse is empty. (335).^^ 
"Dies Untergehen erscheint einesteils als unerwartet, insofem an dem Quantum, ohne das 
MaB und die Qualitat zu verandem, geSndert werden kann, andemteils aber wird es zu einem 
ganz Begreiflichen gemacht, namlich dutch die Allmahlichkeit. Zu dieser Kategorie wird so 
leicht gegriffen, um das Vergehen von einer Qualitdt oder von etwas vorstellig zu machen oder zu 
erkldren, indem man so dem Verschwinden beinahe mil den Augen zusehen zu kdnnen scheint, 
weil das Quantum als die auBerliche, ihrer Natur nach veranderliche Grenze gesetzt ist, hiemet 
die Veranderung, als nut das Quantums, sich von selbst versteht. In der Tat aber wird nichts 
dadurch erklart; Die VerSnderung ist. . . wesenlicht der Ubergang einer Qualitat in eine andere, 
oder der abstraktere von einem Dasein in ein Nichtdasein; darin liegt eine andere Bestimmungals 
in der Allmahlichkeit, welche nur eine Verminderung oder Vermehrung imd das einsetige 
Festhalten an der GroBe ist." [1:344-35]. 
® "[Mjacht [etwa] das Ausraufen Eines Haares vom Kopf.. . kahl, oder hdrt ein haufe auf, 
ein Haufe zu sein, wenn ein Kom weggenommen wird? Dies kaim man unbedenklish zugeben, 
indem solche Wegnahme nur einen und zwar selbst ganz unbedeutenden quantitativen 
Unterschied ausmacht; so wird ein Haar, ein Kom weggenommen und dies so wiederholt, daB 
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In the next chapter, Hegel returns to gradualness to suggest that the 
gradual, quantitative side of change is external to the thing: 
On the qualitative side... the gradual, merely quantitative 
progress ... is absolutely interrupted; the new quality in its merely 
quantitative relationship is, relatively to the vanishing quality, an 
indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is therefore a leap 
.... People fondly try to make an alteration comprehensible by 
means of the gradualness of the transition; but the truth is that 
gradualness is an alteration which is merely indifferent, the opposite 
of qualitative change. (368).^" 
Hegel goes on to complain that gradualism quantifies and therefore 
externalizes qualitative change, thereby robbing change of its 
immanence. (370-71) Gradualness, in short, subjectifies what should be 
an objective process.'^i 
Jeanne Schroeder'^^ f^ds in these passages the explanation of some 
American constitutional law familiar to every first year law student. 
American law permits land use regulation, but if the regulation goes 
"too far," it becomes a taking of the land itself. This triggers the 
government's obligation to pay just compensation (or to repeal the 
oppressive regulation). Thus, regulation's quantitative burden can be 
gradually increased with no qualitative change, but there comes a 
sudden moment when quantitative change is so great that a qualitative 
change is effected. Regulation has become expropriation. This 
moment, however, is never present but is always retroactively noted, 
after the qualitative change has occurred. For this reason, neither the 
Supreme Court nor its innumerable interpreters can say in advance what 
constitutes too much regulation, just as we can never specify the exact 
jedesmal nach dem, was zugegeben worden, nur Eines weggenommen wird; zuletzt zeigt sich die 
qualitative Veranderung, daB der Kopf.. . kahl, der Haufe verschwunden ist. Man vergaB bei 
jenem Zugeben nicht nur die Wiederholung, sondem daB sich die ftir sich unbedeutenden 
Quantitaten (wie die fUr sich unbedeutenden Ausgaben von einem Vermogen) sutnmieren und die 
Suinme das qualitativ Ganze ausmacht, so daB am Ende dieses verschwunden, der Kopf kahl, der 
Beutel leer ist." [1:345], 
70 "Nach der qualitativen Seite . .. das bloB quantitative Fortgehen der Allmahlichkeit... ist, 
absolut abgebrochen; indem die neu eintretende Qualitat nach ihrer bloB quantitativen Beziehimg 
eine gegen die verschwindende imdestimmt andre, eine gleichgilltige ist, ist der Ubergang ein 
Sprung.... Man sucht sich gem furch die Allmahlichkeit des Ubergangs eine Veranderung 
begreiflich zu machen; aber vielmehr ist die Allmahlichkeit gerade die bloB gleichgilltige 
Andenmg, das Gegenteil der qualitativen." [1:381]. 
71 For example, in an attempt to save the American legal system from the nihilism of Critical 
Legal Studies, Andrew Altman annoimces that we "more or less" live imder a mle of law. I have 
suggested that the invocation "more or less" is designed to lend the American system some 
"give," so that counter-examples of lawlessness cannot blow apart the argument. David Gray 
Carlson, Liberal Philosophy's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 257 
(1993). 
72 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam Today: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84 
GEO. L.J. 1531 (1996). 
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hair that, if extracted, makes a man bald.''^ 
Hegel states that common sense errs when it answers that removal 
of a single hair does not produce baldness. The mistake is "assuming a 
quantity to be only an indifferent limit, i.e. of assuming that it is just a 
quantity in the specific sense of quantity." (336)''^ In other words, 
quantitative change is thought to have no bite. What common sense 
misses is that "quantity is a moment of measure and is connected with 
quality." (336)^^ when Quantum is taken as an indifferent limit of a 
thing, it leaves the thing "open to unsuspected attack and destruction." 
(336)^^ Gradual quantitative change can lead to a catastrophic 
coupure?'^ 
B. Specifying Measure 
If Measure undergoes qualitative change at the alteration of 
magnitude, we are in the realm of Immediate Measure. But if we admit 
that some quantitative change can occur within a range without any 
qualitative change, then we are in the more advanced realm of 
Specifying Measure. Here Quality has some independence from 
Quantum.'^ Therefore, we have: 
Hegel endorses such analytic use of Measure in the Lesser Logic: 
It would be a mistake to treat these examples [including that of the bald man] as 
pedantic futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great 
importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, 
there is a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the 
Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on 
the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure ... makes itself felt, and a 
court, which a moment before was held good economy, tums into avarice or 
prodigality. 
LESSER LOGIC, supra note *, § 108 Remark. 
"[Ejine Quantitat nur fUr cine gleichgilltige Grenze, d.h. sic eben im bestimmten Sinne 
einer Quantitat zu nehmen." [1:345]. 
75 "Moment des MaBes zu sein und mit der Qualitat zusammenzuhangen, konfondiert" 
[1:345]. 
76 "[LF]nverdachtig angegriffen und zugrunde gerichtet wird." [1:346]. 
77 Hegel further remarks: 
It is the cimning of the Notion to seize on this aspect of a reality where its quality 
does not seem to come into play; and such is its cunning that the aggrandizement of a 
State or of a fortune, etc., which leads finally to disaster for the State or for the owner, 
even appears at first to be their good fortune. (336). 
"Es ist die List des Begriffes, ein Dasein an dieser Seite zu fassen, von der seine 
Qualitat nicht ins Spiel zu kommen scheint,—^imd zwar so sehr, daB VergrdBerung 
eines Staats, eines Vermogens usf, welche das Unglilck des Staats, des Besitzers 
herbeifuhrt, sogar als dessen Gliick zunachst erscheint." [1:346]. 
78 As Hegel puts it: 
Now that aspect of the quantum according to which it is an indifferent limit which 
can be exceeded without altering the quality, is also distinguished from its other aspect 
according to which it is qualitative and specific. (336). 
Von der Seite nun, nach welcher das Quantum gleichgilltige Grenze ist, an der 
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Figure 18(c) 
Specifying Measure 
As always, Speculative Reason names motion.^^ Gazing back at 
Figure 18(b), it notices that Measure can undergo some limited amount 
of quantitative change without also undergoing qualitative change. 
How does Hegel derive the resilience of quality from quantitative 
change? Simply by pointing out that, at this point, resilience is quality: 
"As a quantum it is an indifferent magnitude open to external 
determination and capable of increase and decrease. But as a measure it 
is also distinguished from itself as a quantum, as such an indifferent 
determination, and is a limitation of that indifferent fluctuation about a 
limit." (334).80 
But this does not mean that Quality is now independent of Quantity 
and therefore immune from ehange—Quantity being the souree of all 
change. "[T]he quantitative determinateness of anything is thus 
twofold—namely, it is that to which the quality is tied and also that 
which can be varied without affecting the quality." (334)®' 
1. The Rule 
The Understanding now intervenes to name the range of 
quantitative ehange that Measure might undergo without suffering from 
qualitative ehange. Rule is "a measure which is external with referenee 
to mere quantum." (336)®^ 
ohne die Quantitat zu andem hin- und hergegangen werden kann, ist seine andere 
Seite, nach welcher as qualitativ, spezifisch ist, auch untershieden. [1:346], 
On this aspect of Speculative Reason, see Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 440-41. 
80 "Als Quantum ist es gleichgiiltige GrdBe, auBerlicher Bestimmung offen und des Auf-
under Abgehens am Mehr und Weniger fahig. Aber als MaB ist es zugleich von sich selbst als 
Quantum, als solcher gleichgiiltigen Bestimmung, verscheiden und cine Beschrankung jenes 
gleichgiiltigen Hin- und Hergehens an einer Grenze." [1:344], 
81 "[D]ie Quantitatsbestimmtheit so an dem Dasein die gedoppelte ist, das cine Mai die, an 
welche die Qualitat gebunden ist, das andere Mai aber die, an der unbeschadet jener hin- und 
hergegangen werden kann," [1:344], 
82 "[E]ine MaB auBerlich gegen das bloBe Quantum," [1:346], 
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Figure 19(a) 
Rule 
Rule is an intrinsically determinate magnitude. It is Unit to some 
other Quantum which is variable Amount. This other Amount is 
precisely what is measured by the Rule, which is, after all. Specifying 
Measure. Hence, we have: 
Figure 19(b) 
Rule Measuring Its Other®^ 
Rule as Unit [1] is external to what it measures [3]. We therefore 
have before us an act of mere comparison.®'* Rule as Unit is "an 
arbitrary magnitude which in turn can equally be treated as an amount 
(the foot as an amount of inches)." (337)®^ Measure, however, is not 
The phrase Specifying Measure should be taken to refer to both the Rule and the ruled, 
considered together. Therefore, I have named [3]—a one-sided concept—as Specifying Measure 
as Amoimt, or "ruled matter." 
"Comparison" is an inferior brand of knowledge, according to Hegel. See Carlson, 
Quality, supra note 9, at 463-64. 
"[E]ine willkurliche GrOfie, die ebenso wieder als Anzahl (der FuB als cine Anzahl von 
Zollen) gesetzt werden kann.". [1:347]. Earlier, Hegel remarks that it is "foolish to speak of a 
natural standard of things." (334) ("Es ist daher toricht, von einem naturlichen MaBstabe der 
Dinge zu Sprechen" [1:344]). Universal standards of measure serve only for external comparison. 
The adoption of a universal standard is therefore merely conventional—"a matter of complete 
indifference." (334) ("ist es vdllig gleichgilltig"[I:344]). A "foot" might be an internal measure— 
where a foot means literally the length of a human being's foot. But where that same foot is 
applied to some thing other than itself, it is only an extemal measure. 
Anglo-American Lawyers are familiar with the chancellor in equity applying the measiu-e 
of his own foot to cases before him: 
Equity is a Rouguish thing, for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to. Equity 
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merely external Rule. "[A]s a specifying measure [1] its nature is to be 
related in its own self [2] to an other which is a quantum [3]." (337)^^ 
Rule is an important concept for American jurisprudence, with its 
emphasis on negative freedom and the rule of law. In the typical (non-
Hegelian) American vision, the human subject is a natural phenomenon, 
with preferences that are simply accepted as given. This natural subject 
is free to do what he will within the bounds of the law, which is 
imposed on the subject externally—^positive law. The function of the 
law is to protect the rights of the next fellow from the exuberance of the 
natural subject. In this vision, the negative freedom of the subject 
accorded by positive law is the range of quantitative change that a 
person can enjoy without qualitative change. If, however, the subject 
transgresses the rule of law, the subject undergoes qualitative change— 
from lawful to lawless.^' 
Hegel endorses the proposition that God is the measure of all 
things. Presumably this means that God Rules. God as Measure "is an 
external kind and manner of determinateness, a more or less, but at the 
same time it is equally reflected into itself, a determinateness which is 
not indifferent and external but intrinsic; it is thus the concrete truth of 
being" (329)^^ So God is not just external to things but is also implicit 
in things. This remark relates to Hegel's characterization of nature as 
the non-spiritual - a necessary other to God, which nevertheless 
implicitly is spiritual. The inherent spirit in nature is why nature, 
ultimately, gives rise to man, reason and mind.^^ 
2. Specifying Measure 
Rule was external, indifferent magnitude "which is now posited by 
some other existence in general in the measurable something." (337)^" 
is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or 
narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the 
measure we call a Foot the Chancellor's Foot, what an uncertain Measure would this 
be! One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third an indifferent Foot: 
'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience. 
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 64 (1689). 
On the conventionality of units of measurement, Harris protests that "today the physicist, 
following Fddington, will claim that there is indeed a natural standard of length, namely, the 
radius of curvatiue of space." HARRIS, supra note 5, at 146. 
86 "[A]ls spezifisches ist es dies, sich an sich selbst zu einem Andem zu verhalten, das ein 
Quantum ist." [1:347]. 
87 See Carlson, supra note 71, at 268-73. 
88 "Aui3erliche Art und Weise, ein Mehr oder Weniger, welches aber zugleich ebenso in sich 
reflektiert, nicht bloB gleichgiiltige und auBerliche, sondem an sich seiende Bestimmtheit ist; es 
ist so die konkrete Warheit des Seins." [1:339]. 
See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 501-506. 
90 "[D]ie mm von einer andem Fxistenz tlberhaupt an dem Ftwas des MaBes gesetzt wird." 
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Rule signifies the dependence of Measure [2, 3] on externality. Yet, 
Specifying Measure, subject to external Rule, is likewise Quantum—an 
internal qualitative Quantum. This Quantum is "being-for-other to 
which the indifferent increasing and decreasing is proper." (337)^' 
As this internal Quantum, [2] in Figure 19(b) is, to a degree, 
indifferent to Rule. Accordingly, [2] can equally be taken as the 
Quality of [2, 3]. Likewise, since [2] is also Rule, Rule is in some sense 
the content of Specifying Measure. Accordingly, the Quantum of Rule 
is likewise qualitative—and likewise located in [2]. In effect, [2, 3] and 
[1, 2] are two Measures—two separate unities of Quality and 
Quantity—facing each other. 
It is a feature of Measure that it cannot alter itself. It must be 
altered from the outside. But "it does not accept this externally imposed 
alteration as an arithmetical amount." (337)^^ Rather, the Measure 
alters at its own pace. By way of example, if you wish to bake a cake, 
you tium the oven on and place the batter inside the oven. The oven 
heats up faster than the cake batter. The heat of the oven of course can 
be measured. The cake batter stands for the ruled matter [3]. It needs 
the oven to be altered from batter to cake, but it obstinately bakes at its 
own rate and takes longer to heat up (and undergo the qualitative 
change from batter to cake) than the ambient air in the oven. 
Meanwhile, the batter influences the oven as well. The oven full of 
cake batter heats up at a slower rate than an empty oven. Each 
Measure—^batter and oven temperature—influences the other's rate of 
change. 
The ruled matter [3] (or, in my example, cake batter) reacts against 
externally imposed matter (the oven) and "behaves towards the amount 
[2] as an intensive quantum." (337)'^ Why this reference to Intensive 
Quantum? This concept (also called Degree and Intensive Magnitude) 
is shown in Figure 14(b) in a negative mode and again in Figure 15(a) 
in its positive mode.^^ Degree, Quantum recaptured some measure of 
its Being-for-self. It stood over against Extensive Magnitude. In Figure 
14(b), Extensive Magnitude saw itself as a plurality and announced, "I 
am not a unit." Intensive Magnitude therefore represented the unit that 
Extensive Magnitude was not. In Degree, "determinate being has 
returned into being-for-self." (218)^^ 
Ruled matter (Specifying Measure as Amount) likewise has being-
for-self [3] which resists externally imposed change. Of course, it is not 
[1:347], 
91 "Seins-fUr-Anderes an ihm, der das gleichgultige Vermehrt- und Vermindertwerden 
zukommt." [1:347], 
92 "[E]s nimmt davon nicht die arithmetische Menge an," [1:347], 
93 "[R]eagiert dagegen, verhalt sich als ein Intensives gegen die Menge," [1:347], 
99 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2070-74, 
95 "[D]as Dasein in das Fiirsiehsein zuruckgegangen," [1:214], 
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entirely immune. The cake cooks, but it does so at its own leisure, not 
at the rate the ambient air of the oven wishes. This is why it takes forty 
minutes to bake a cake and why a watched pot never boils. 
This resistance of ruled matter also explains Hegel's earlier remark 
that Measure, in its more developed form, is necessity, or fate. Thus, 
Nemesis attacks those who are presumptuous, who think themselves too 
great. By bringing down the presumptuous and reducing them to 
nothing, "mediocrity is restored," Hegel remarks. (329)^^ 
Fate is Specifying Measure as Amoimt, which resists the subjective 
will of presumptuous rulers. Human society insists on its own rate of 
quantitative (and eventually qualitative) change. Those who insist on 
speeding up the rate of change are taught a hard lesson that bureaucracy 
has a quality of its own. Its quality is its own unique rate of change. 
Nevertheless, human institutions do change, and they require impatient 
reformers to work hard in order to effectuate that change. This is why 
Rome was not built in a day. 
Ratio of Measures. In Figure 19(b), two Measures face each other 
and form a unique Ratio of Measures which is an "exponent"^"' different 
from either Measure. (337) The Ratio of Measures, sometimes called 
Realized Measure or Specified Measure, is shown in Figure 19(c): 
Figure 19(c) 
Ratio of Measures 
(Realized or Specified Measure) 
In Figure 19(c), the two Measures, each an arithmetic progression 
within which neither undergoes quantitative change, produce yet a third 
arithmetic progression, which is different from the "incommensurable 
96 "[D]ie MittelmaBigkeit, hergestellt werde." [1:339]. This may be a comment on the fall of 
Napoleon. In a private letter, Hegel commented on the event: "There is nothing more tragic .... 
The entire mass of mediocrity, with its irresistible leaden weight of gravity, presses on, without 
rest or reconciliation, until it succeeded in bringing down what is high to the same level or even 
below." JACQUES D'HONDT, HEGEL IN HIS TIME: BERLIN, 1818-1831 31 (John Burbidge trans., 
1988). A believer in historical greatness, Hegel showed a lack of patience for historians who 
sought to remove the halo from heroes by pointing out base motives for their great acts. "If 
heroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests alone, they would never 
have accomplished what they have." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 140 Remark. 
97 Oddly, Hegel uses the term "exponent" to describe what we might call a quotient. Carlson, 
Quantity, supra note 4, at 2098 & n.I81. Thus, if A/B = C, Hegel calls C the exponent. 
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ratios" (138)98 that make it up.99 Alteration of the Measure, then, 
consists by itself in the addition of such a numerical one and then 
another and so on. If in this way the alteration of the extemal 
quantum is an arithmetical progression, the specifying reaction of the 
qualitative natiue of measure produces another series which is 
related to the first, increases and decreases with it, but not in a ratio 
determined by a numerical exponent but in a number of 
incommensurable ratios, according to a determination of powers. 
(338)100 
This new range of values is the qualitative moment of the Ratio of 
Measure, and it is "the qualitative moment itself which specifies the 
quantum as such." (338)ioi What this implies is that, when a Measure is 
observed (or Specified), the reality of the Measure is validly observed. 
Yet, the Measure in part escapes observation—the unmeasured thing [3] 
lies beyond the Ratio of Measures that is actually observed [4, 6]. In 
short, to measure a thing is to change it. 
a. Remark 
In the Remark following Rule and Specifying Measure, Hegel 
gives temperature as an example of the Ratio of Measures. In 
temperature, he says, "two sides of extemal and specified quantum are 
98 "[I]nkoinmensurabeln Verhaltnisse." [1:348]. 
99 Hegel compares Figure 19(c) to the progress conceming Intensive Quantum and Extensive 
Quantum. In Figures 14 and 15, each of these ideas was promoted in tum by the Understanding. 
In Figure 14(a), Extensive Quantum (or Extensive Magnitude) was presented as representing 
Amoimt. Then a single Degree was brought to the fore as primus inter pares of all the 
numbers—i.e., the lOOth degree. The Understanding next grabbed hold of Intensive Quantum (or 
Degree). But Dialectical Reason showed that Degree was dependent on plurality for its identity. 
Thus, the 100th degree was incoherent without an extemal reference to lst-99th degree and 101st 
degree and higher. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 1068-74. Throughout this process, 
Hegel now writes, "the quantum lying at the base suffers no alteration, the difference being only 
an outer form." (338) ("Das zugrunde liegende Quantum erleidet in diesem Unterschiede Keine 
Veranderung, dieser ist nur cine auBere Form" [1:348]). Specifying Measure is different. Here, 
"the quantum is taken in the first instance in its immediate magnitude [1], but in the second 
instance it is taken through the exponent of the ratio [2] in another amount [3]." (338) ("hingegen 
ist das Quantum das cine Mai in seiner unmittelbaren Gr6l3e, das andere Mai aber wird es durch 
den Verhaltnisexpontenten in einer andem Anzahl genommen" [1:348]. The point seems to be 
that each Measure alters the other (through quantitative change). Measure therefore has physical 
consequence, whereas the alteration between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude did not. 
100 "[B]esteht flir sich in dem Hinzutreten eines solchen numerischen Eins und wieder eines 
solchen usf. Wenn so das auBerliche Quantum in arithmetischer Progression sich verandert, so 
bringt die spezifizierende Reaktion der qualitativen Natur des MaBes cine andere Reihe hervor, 
wleche sich auf die erste bezieht, mit ihr zu- und adnimmt, aber nicht in einem durch einen 
Zahlenexpontenten bestimmten, sondem einer Zahl inkommensurabeln Verhaltnisse, nach einer 
Potenzenbestimmung." [1:348]. 
101 "[D]as Moment des Qualitativen selbst zu verstehen, welches das Quantum als solches 
spezifiert." [1:348], 
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distinguished." (338)'02 The temperature of a body is registered in the 
external quantum of yet another body—mercury in a thermometer, for 
instance. Yet, the body of a sick child and the thermometer differ in the 
rate at which they absorb temperature. The child's temperature affects 
the thermometer, but (it is forgotten) the thermometer affects the 
temperature of the child, "and the change of temperature in any one of 
them does not correspond in a direct ratio with that of the medium or of 
the other bodies among themselves." (338-39)'"^ Each body has a 
"specific heat."'®'' Temperature is in fact a ratio that differs from the 
temperature of either side of the ratio of child and thermometer. 
The Ratio of Measures must not be looked at as the relation of 
mere Quantity to Quality. "In fact," Hegel writes, "the determining of 
the specifying ratio has now advanced to the stage where the moments 
of measure not only consist of a quantitative side and a side qualifying 
the quantum, both being sides of one and the same quality, but are 
related to each other as two qualities which are in themselves 
measures." (339)'®^ In short, two complete Measures face each other, 
and produce yet another Measure which is a middle term—^though 
mistakenly taken as being the truth of the Specified Measure. 
3. Relation of the two Sides as Qualities 
In Figure 19(c), the qualitative side of the Ratio of Measures is 
intrinsic yet determinate (i.e., constituted by Quantity). The quantitative 
side is said to be external [1]. But this externality is sublated and 
becomes internal [4, 5]. "This qualitative side," Hegel concludes, "thus 
has a quantum for i ts  presupposit ion and its  start ing point."  (339) '®® I n  
other words, quality presupposes an externality, and, as we are still in 
the realm of Being, this externality is still taken as the starting point for 
determining what the thing is. 
The external Quantity, however, has a quality of its own and so is 
qualitatively distinguishable from its other. Each Measure in the ratio is 
qualitatively distinguishable, and this very difference is their unity. 
102 "[D]iese beiden Seiten, auBerliches und spezifiertes Quantum zu sein, unterscheiden." 
[1:348], 
103 "[D]ie Temperaturveranderung deselben nicht der des Mediums oder ihrer untereinander 
im direlUen Verhaltnisse entspricht." [1:349], 
10'' In physics, "specific heat" is the ratio of (a) the quantity of heat required to raise the 
temperature of a body one degree to (b) the quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of 
an equal mass of water one degree, 
105 "Wie sich das spezifizierende Verhaltnis gleich weiter bestimmen wird, dafi die Momente 
des MaBes nicht nur in einer quantitativen und enier das Quantum qualifizierenden Seite einer 
und derselben Qualitat bestehen, sondem im Verhaltnisse zweier Quanlitaten, welche an ihnen 
selbst MaBe sind," [1:349], 
106 "[S]ie hat so dasselbe zu ihrer Vorausserzung und fangt von ihm an," [1:349], 
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This qualitative difference [2] is now sublated in the Ratio of Measures. 
It is "now to be posited in the immediacy of being as such, in which 
determination measure still is." (339)"'7 That is, externality is sublated, 
and Measure embraces immediacy. 
Each of the two sides is qualitatively related and yet each is itself a 
Determinate Being—hence both qualitative and quantitative. The unity 
of the two extremes (each a Measure) is likewise a Measure. "Measure 
is thus the immanent quantitative relationship of two qualities to each 
other." (340)109 
Measure now has "variable magnitude^ (340)iio Quantum is 
sublated, so that it is no longer Quantum—determined extemally. Now 
it is "quantum and something else." (340)i'i This additional something 
is a qualitative element and "nothing else than its relation of powers." 
(340)112 In Immediate Measure, alteration was not yet posited. Any 
change in the "arbitrary, single quantum" (340)ii2 likewise changed the 
quality of the Measure. In Specifying Measure, however, we have "an 
alteration of the merely external quantum by the qualitative element." 
(340)111 A distinction is now posited between two specific magnitudes. 
There is a plurality of Measures constituting the Ratio of Measures, 
which is itself external to its two sides—as shown as [7] in Figure 19(c). 
Each side is to be distinguished from the Ratio of Measures [2, 4]. "It is 
in this distinguishedness of the quantum from itself—i.e., from each 
individual side—that a Measure "first shows itself to be a real 
[daseiendes] measure." (340)ii5 In this guise of distinguishing itself— 
[1] or [3]—from itself [2], each Measure "now appears as a Determinate 
Being which is both one and the same (e.g. the constant temperature of 
the medium), and also quantitatively varied (in the different 
temperatures of the bodies present in the medium)." (340)"^ In other 
lO'' "[DJieser Unterschied beider ist in der Unmittelbarkeit des Seins ttberhaupt, in welcher das 
Mafi noch ist, zu setzen." [1:349]. 
108 In his account of Measure, John Burbidge tends to say things like "measurement is ... 
nothing but a proportion between two numbers." BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 
46. But it is very important to see the extremes as, not just numbers, but themselves independent 
Measures, the middle term of which is a metonymic "average" which we take to be the measure 
of a thing. To say that the extremes are mere numbers is to omit that they are more than numbers. 
They are Measures in and of themselves. 
109 "Das MaB ist so das immanente quantitative Verhalten zweier Qualitaten zueinander." 
[1:350]. 
110 "[V]eranderlichen GroBe." [1:350]. 
111 "[A]ls Quantum und zugleich als etwas anderes." [1:350]. 
112 "[N]ichts anderes als das Potenzenverhaltnis desselben." [1:350]. 
113 "[l]rgend und zwar ein einzelnes Quantum." [1:350]. 
11'l "[E]iner Veranderung des bloB auBerlichen Quantums durch das Qualitative." [1:350]. 
115 "[D]as Quantum zeigt sich est als daseiendes MaB in solcher Unterschiefenheit seiner von 
sich selbst indem es." [1:350]. 
110 "[E]ein und dasselbe (z. B. dieselbe Temperatur des Mediums), zugleich als verschiedes 
und zwar quantitatives Dasein (—in den verschiedenen Temperaturen der in jenem befindlichen 
Kdrper) hervortritt." [1:350]. 
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words, the Measures are both the Ratio of Measures and not the Ratio of 
Measures. 
In the Ratio of Measures (or Realized Measure), one side of the 
ratio is Amount, "which increases and decreases in an external 
arithmetical progression." (341)"^ This is the external Measure which 
is applied against the measured material. This is, for instance, the 
thermometer in the baby. The other side is the measured material-
Unit to the external Amount. This would be the baby. But which side 
is which? Since the baby affects the thermometer as well as the 
thermometer affecting the baby, only external will can discern the 
difference. For themselves, "it is immaterial which is regarded as 
increasing or decreasing merely externally in arithmetical progression, 
and which, on the other hand, [is] specifically determining the other 
quantum." (341)"^ 
Nevertheless, Rule and Specifying Measure as Amount must be 
present. Furthermore, the quality of one side of the ratio must be 
"extensive," and the other must be "intensive." Extensiveness stands 
for externality. Extensive quantity is Amount, power, and becoming-
other. Intensiveness stands for being-within-self which is immune 
from, or "negative relatively" to, the other. (341)''^ Intensive quantity 
is Unit and root. 
a. Remark 
In this remark, Hegel expostulates on velocity If s/t is 
merely taken as a Direct Ratio {A/B = Q, then "it is immaterial which 
of the two moments is to be considered as amount or as unit." (342)'2i 
A Direct Ratio is merely a "formal determination which has no 
existence except as an intellectual abstraction." (342)'22 Even if the 
Direct Ratio is the ratio of root and square (s - a?—Galileo's formula 
117 " [D]ie in auflerlicher, arithmetischer Progression auf- und adgeht." [1:351]. 
11^ "[I]st es gleichvel, an welcher die Vermehrung oder Verminderung als bloB auBerlich, in 
arithmetisher Progression fortgehend, und welche dagegen als an diessem Quantum sich 
spezifisch bestimmend angehesen wird." [1:351], 
119 "Negative gegenjene." [1:351], 
120 Here, s = space and t = time, 
121 "[S]o ist es gleichgiiltig, welches von beiden Momenten als die Anzahl oder als die Einheit 
betrachtet werden soli," [1:352], Direct Ratio is shown in Figure 17(a), See Carlson, Quantity, 
supra note 4, at 2141, In Direct Ratio {A/B = C), either A or B could be Amount in which case 
either 1/A or 1/B was Unit, The problem with Direct Ratio was that both sides of the equation 
could be multiplied by B/C or A/C, in which case the "exponent" (or quotient) could equally be 
said to be Unit or Amount, 
122 "[Z]ur formellen, nicht existierenden, sondem nur der abstrahierenden Reflexion 
Betsimmung," [1:352], 
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for the speed of falling bodies),123 the root (t) is an empirical, external 
quantum. The other side {s, as in a = s/t^) is "taken as specified." 
(342)124 
The Ratio of Measures is more advanced, Hegel says, than the 
Direct Ratio. The logic of Measure requires "the qualifying of the 
quantitative." (342)i25 Because Measure brings to the fore the quality of 
both sides of the Ratio of Measures, 5^ = at^ (Kepler's third law 
concerning the motion of planets)i26 is more "notional, because "both 
sides are related to each other in higher determinations of powers." 
(342)127 
At the level of Ratio of Measures, space, "like weight in specific 
gravity, is an external, real whole as such—^hence amount—^whereas 
time, like volume, is the ideal, negative factor, the side of unity." 
(342)12^ In other words, velocity is measured in units of time. Time is 
therefore internal and qualitative to velocity, but also negative, as time 
is a self-devouring "absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189)i29 
Presumably, this means that the outside measurer can manipulate space 
traversed because she is in control of acceleration. But, no matter what 
she does, she cannot speed up or slow down the clock—^not at least in a 
Newtonian universe. 
Kepler's formula expresses "that which holds between the 
magnitudes of space and time in free motion." (342)'2o jt is a formula 
more important than the formula for mere velocity. Hegel had earlier 
said that the free motion of celestial bodies "is determined solely by the 
Notion." (332)121 jhat is, there is nothing contingent about the way the 
123 s = ai c&n be viewed as Direct Ratio if it is taken as a = stl/O- The hallmark of Direct 
Ratio (A/B = C) is that, as A grows, B does as well. In Indirect Ratio (A = BC), as B grows C 
shrinks. The difference between Direct and Indirect Ratio is that, in Direct Ratio, the 
mathematician may switch the exponent with one of the sides. In Indirect Ratio, the exponent is 
fixed, which exhibits a qualitative resistance to external manipulation. That is, in .4 = BC, if A is 
fixed, C can shrink (in which case B grows). But C can never shrink to zero without destroying 
the exponent. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2143-44. 
124 "[A]ls spezifiert zu nehmen ist." [1:352]. 
125 "Realisation d'er Qualifikation des Quantitativen." [1:352]. 
126 Here, s stands for the semimajor axis of an ellipse—i.e., the farthest distance possible 
between the planet and the center of the sun. The variable t stands for the period of the orbit (for 
earth, one year). 
127 "[D]al3 beide Seiten in hohem Potenzenbestimmungen ... sich verhalten." [1:352]. 
128 "[W]ie in der spezifischen Schwere das Gewicht, ist auBerliches reales Ganzes Uberhaupt, 
somit Anzahl, die Zeit hingegen,... wie das Volumen, ist das Ideele, das Negative, die Seite der 
Einheit." [1:352]. Specific gravity is the ratio of (a) the density of a substance to (b) the density of 
some other substance (i.e., pure water taken at its maximum density at 4°C, when both densdies 
are obtained by weighing the substances in air. For instance, if one cubic inch of gold weighs 
19.3 times as much as one cubic inch of water, the specific gravity of gold is 19.3). 
129 "[E]in absolutes AuBersichkommen." [1:182]. 
130 "[D]aB in der freien Bewegung,—zuerst der noch des Falls—Zeit- und Raum-Quantitat." 
[1:352-53]. 
131 "[N]ur durch den Begriff bestimmte." [1:341]. Harris proclaims such remarks to be 
Einsteinian. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 146. 
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planets, in their evil mixture, move about the glorious planet Sol 
(according to Kepler's r' - In fact, Hegel stiggests such ftee 
motion rests "on the nature of the interrelated qualities of sp^e and 
time" (342)1" in Kepler's ratio, time and space are said to be 
''inseparable and their quantitative relationship is the being-for-self of 
measure " (343)'" Thus, time and space bear the relation that by/ox 
bears in'calculus. Neither 5y nor 5x has any meaning separate from 
their ratio. The ratio is what bore the Being-for-self of the denvative. 
A true science, Hegel now reminds us, carmot be merely empirical, 
though this work is admittedly useful. Little has been done however, 
with regard to Measure which is "strictly scientific (i.e., non-
empirical) (343)'^^ "It is a great service to ascertain the empincal 
numbers of nature, e.g. the distance of the planets from one anothen" 
(343)'" It is "an infinitely greater"'" service, however, when the 
empirical numbers disappear and the universal forms (natural laws) are 
manifested'"—"immortal service which Galileo for the descent of 
132 As Shakespeare describes the planets: 
The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre, 
Observe degree, priority, and place, 
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form, 
Office, and custom, in all line of order 
And therefore is the glorious planet Sol 
In noble eminence enthroned and sphered 
Amidst the other; whose med'cinable eye 
Corrects the ill aspects of planets evil. 
And posts, like the commandment of a king, 
Sans check, to good and bad; but when the planets. 
In evil mixture, to disorder wander, 
What plagues and what portents, what mutiny, 
What raging of the sea, shaking of earth. 
Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors, 
Divert and crack, rend and deracinate 
The unity and married calm of states 
Quite from their fixure? 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 1, sc. 3. n-rssi 
133 "iDler Natur der im Verhalmis stehenden Qualitaten des Raums under der Zeit. [1.353T 
The motion of falling bodies (s = at"), however, and mechanical motion m general are said to be 
conditioned (342). Presumably this means that falling bodies start from rest and are impelled by 
external force to move. Not so with the happy planets, which simply move accordmg 
" with regard to unfree mechanical motion, Hegel says that the time factor (t) is said to be 
the root and the space factor is a square—that is, s is a function oft'. With the planets, howeve^ 
the period of revolution around the sun (s') is one power higher than that of space (because 
"[U]ntrennbar .. ., und ihr quantitatives Verhalmis das Fiirsichsein des Mafles." [1:353]. 
135 "fEhgentlich wissenchaftlich." [1:353]. 
136 "Es ist ein groBes Verdienst, die empirischen Zahlen der Natur kennen zu lemen, z. . 
Entfemungen der Planeten voneinander." [1:353]. 
138 TS"S^ refe^ncrtoK early dissertation De Orbitus Planetarum. See supra 
note 4. 
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falling bodies and Kepler for the motion of the celestial bodies have 
achieved." (343)^^^ These laws were induced from mere experience. 
"But yet a still higher proof is required for these laws." (343)''*'' The 
laws must be proven from the very notions of time and space 
themselves."Of this kind of proof there is still no trace in the said 
mathematical principles of natural philosophy." (343)'''2 
C. Being-For-Self in Measure 
The Ratio of Measures (or Specified Measure) has a Being-for-
self. Being-for-self—the final segment of Quality—^represented self-
annihilation. More precisely, the truth of finite Being was that it ceased 
to be. Similarly, the Being-for-self of measure is also self-annihilation. 
In Figure 19(c), the extremes had quantitative elements that were 
qualitatively determined. In other words, each extreme making up the 
Ratio of Measures was itself a Measure, as shown in Figure 19(c). 
These extremes had an existence that exceeded the Specified Measure— 
[1] and [3] in Figure 19(c). As such, they are "so far posited only as 
immediate, merely different qualities." (344)'''3 They do not have the 
continuous nature of their quantitative side and indeed have a meaning 
of their own quite divorced from the ratio in which they participate. In 
short, [1] is space and [3] is time, if we consider velocity. Each can be 
139 "[U]nsterbliche Verdienste, die sich z.B. Galilei in Rtlcksicht auf den Fall und Kepler in 
Riicksicht auf die Bewegung der himmlischen Kdrper erworben hat." [1:353]. 
140 "Es ijjuB aber noch ein hbheres Beweisen dieser Gesetze gefordert werden." [1:354]. 
141 Professor Harris reads this appeal as one that Einstein would answer in the twentieth 
century. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 143. 
142 "Von dieser Art des Beweisens findet sich in jenen mathematischen Prinzipien der 
Naturphilosopie." [1:354]. For a description of Hegel's attempt to "notionalize" Galileo's law, 
see Stefan Butner, Hegel on Galilei's Law of Fall, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, 
at 331, 337-38. 
Hegel goes on here to complain again of Newton's attempt to deduce the physics of the 
natural world from the calculus. "These proofs presuppose their theorems, those very laws, from 
experience; what they succeed in doing is to reduce them to abstract expressions and convenient 
formulae." (343) ("Diese Beweise setzen ihre Theoreme, eben jene Gesetzt, aus der Erfahrung 
voraus."[l:354]). Hegel predicts: 
Undoubtedly the time will come when, with a clearer understanding of what 
mathematics can accomplish and has accomplished, the entire, real merit of Newton as 
against Kepler—the sham scaffolding of proofs heing discarded—^will clearly be seen 
to be restricted to the said transformation of Kepler's formula. (343-44) (footnote 
omitted). 
Das ganze reelle Verdienst, das Newton im Vorzug gegen Kepler in Beziehung auf die 
namlichen Gegenstande zugeschrieben wird, wird—das ScheingerUste von Beweisen 
abgezogen—ohne Zweifel bei gereinigterer Reflexion Uber das, was die Mathematik zu 
leisten vermag und was sie geleistet hat, einst mit deutlicher Kenntnis auf jene 
Umformung des Ausdrucks. [1:354] (footnote omitted). 
On Hegel's earlier attack on Newton, see Carlson, Quantity, supra noX& A, at 2110-11. 
143 "[D]ie Qualitaten nur erst noch als unmittelhare, nur verschiedene gesetz." [1:354]. 
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seen to operate independently of the other. 
If [1] and [3] are immediate qualities, [2] must be the quantitative 
side of Measure. But [2] is just as immediate—qualitative—as [1] and 
[3] are. Simultaneously, [2] is just as much a part of [1, 2] and [2, 3] as 
[1] and [3] are respectively. Hence, the immediate quality is just as 
much an immediate quantum. 
The quantitative aspect of the Ratio of Measures is what can be 
altered externally. Consequently, the Ratio of Measures is in part 
beyond itself—subject to outside control. That is, [4, 5] of the Ratio is 
just as much [1] because [4, 5] participates in the externality of [1, 2, 4, 
5]; likewise [4, 6] is just as much [3]. Accordingly, "[qjuality and 
quantum as thus also appearing outside the specific measure [or Ratio of 
Measures] are at the same time correlated with it." (344)^'^'' 
External Quantum, then, is part of the Ratio of Measures, but it is 
"externally given." (345)1^5 xhis givenness by an external measurer 
(who now replaces the external mathematician in the Quantity chapters) 
is "the negation of the qualitative determination of measure." (345)i'*^ 
This negation of the qualitative aspect of the Ratio of Measures is 
nevertheless inside the Ratio of Measures—on the law of sublation. 
Hence, the qualitative heart of the Ratio of Measures is its quantitative 
promiscuity toward outside manipulation. This negativity at the heart of 
the Ratio of Measures is the Being-for-self of that entity. For this 
reason, Hegel says that "[t]he qualitative element thus masks itself, 
specifying not itself but the quantitative determinateness." (344)i^'' In 
short, the Ratio of Measures is telling us what it is not. It is not 
independent from outside manipulation, and this susceptibility is 
precisely its quality. 
Specified Measure is still specified. It is the qualitative "unit 
appearing as empirical, in the quantitative side of measure." (345)^''^ 
But, even if its empirical unit is given to it, its true Being-for-self is 
hidden and still implicit. Its freedom from Specifying Measures is not 
yet truly "for-itself." For now, it is still a Determinate Being—"the 
quotient or exponent of a direct ratio between the sides of the measure. 
(345)150 
144 "Qualitat und Quantum auch so auBer dem spezifischen MaBe auftretend, sind zugleich in 
der Beziehung auf dieses." [1:355]. 
145 "[AjuBerlich gegebenes." [1:355]. 
146 "[D]ie Negation der qualitativen MaBbestimmung." [1:355]. 
147 "Das Qualitative verhiillt sich so, als nicht sich selbst, sondem die GroBebestimmtheit 
spezifierend." [1:354-55]. 
148 Writing of the passage just explicated, Cinzia Ferrini remarks, "It is clear that for Hegel the 
empirical numbers of nature are now 'an sich' captured by the conceptual net... which reveals 
something basic to them: namely, ther qualitative aspect." Ferrini, Framing, supra note 4, at 299. 
149 "Empirisch erscheinende Einheit in dem Quantitativen des MaBes." [1:356]. 
150 "Quotient oder Exponent als eines Verhaltnisses der Seiten des MaBes, dies Verhaltnis als 
ein direktes genommen." [1:356]. 
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Falling Bodies. Hegel returns to the falling body, which moves 
according to 5 = af. This is a Ratio of Powers—a qualitative "natural" 
feature of all bodies that fall. As a mere mathematical expression, 
however, it is merely a Direct Ratio, in which space and time are 
indifferently brought together. 
The velocity of an accelerating body is an expression of space 
traversed in the very first Unit of time.'^' That is, the accelerating body 
has an average velocity, which is never its true speed. In the statement 
of velocity (for example, 25 MPH)—space is Amount as "determined 
by the specifying measure." (345)'^^ That is, the falling object does not 
demand that it fall 25 miles. This criterion is imposed upon it. Yet, 
since we are considering the law of falling bodies as a Direct Ratio, 
space is just as much exponent as Amount. The velocity found by the 
measurer is therefore "the merely formal velocity which is not 
specifically determined by the Notion." (345)'53 The velocity at the first 
imit of time does not actually exist, nor does the velocity at the last unit 
of time. Velocity is merely an average parading as the true velocity at 
any given unit of time.^^'' "[TJhis so-called unit of time is itself only an 
assumed unit and has as such atomic point no real being." (345-46)'^^ 
The real Being-for-self in velocity is the constant a. "The same co­
efficient a remains in all the following units of time," Hegel notes. 
( 3 4 5 ) H e r e  i s  w h a t  i s  r e a l l y  i n t e r n a l  t o  v e l o c i t y .  S p a c e  a n d  t i m e  a r e  
externally imposed on the Measure. Yet, it is Being-for-self "only in so 
far as this moment is unexplicated [an sichl and hence an immediacy." 
(346)15"' In short, the Being-for-self of the Specified Measure is 
precisely not its empirical measure. 
Hegel concludes the first chapter of Measure by stating, "Measure 
151 Why is time "Unit?" According to one commentator, "the qualitative moment of time 
constitutes a being-for-self, time being negatively related to itself in a manner which is still 
entirely abstract. It is because of this that it qualifies as the relational unit and therefore as a 
denominator." Butner, supra note 142, at 338. 
152 "[D]urch das spezifizierende MaB bestimmte Aehl." [1:356]. 
'53 "[F]ormellen, nicht durch den Begriff spezifisch bestimmten Geschwindigkeit." [1:356]. 
'54 "Fall, therefore, would be only a truly uniformly accelerated motion if the radius of the 
Earth were infinite, or, as Popper realized, if the height of the fall were zero. Paradoxically 
enough, only if the movement it involves were not a fall, would the law governing it be realized 
as a imiformly accelerated motion." Butner, supra note 142, at 336 (citing KARL R. POPPER, THE 
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1986)). 
'55 "[D]ieser sogenannte Zeitmoment ist cine selbst nur angenommene Einheit und hat als 
solcher atomer Punkt kein Dasein." [1:356]. According to the Science of Logic's translator, 
"[t]his certainly indicates that he thought that the concrete sciences systematized in the 
Philosophy of Nature are dealing only with a sort of outer appearance, that the inner reality of the 
measurements and calculations by means of which they make their subject matter intelligible has 
to be sought here in the Logic ..." Arnold Vincent Miller, Defending Hegel's Philosophy of 
Nature, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 103, 112. 
156 "[D]erselbe Koeffizient a bliebt in alien fiilgenden zeitpunkten." ersten Zeitmoment sein." 
[1:356]. 
'52 "[I]nsofem dasselbe an sich und daher als unmittelbares ist." [1:357]. 
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has now acquired the character of a specified quantitative relation 
which, as qualitative, has in it the ordinary external quantum." (346)'^^ 
But Measure is not just this Quantum. It is "a fixed exponent." (346)'59 
As such. Measure has an integrity against the measurer. This qualitative 
aspect of the Measure in fact belies the quantitative expression. No 
quantum can ever state the true speed of the falling body at any given 
moment. Thus, Measure has two sides—each of which is a Measure. 
One side is "immediate and external, and the other immanently 
specified."'®" (347) That these two moments are unified in Figure 19(c) 
"means that measure is now. . . realised" (347)'®' In this realization, 
however, "[t]he self-determination of the relation is thus negated." 
(347)'®2 Its explicit determinateness comes from its external other. 
Measure was supposed to be qualitative in its own self, "but possesses 
in truth such qualitative determinateness only in the other side of the 
relation." (347)'®3 
Measure is thus merely a negative unity—"a real being-for-self, 
the category of a something as a unity of qualities which are related as 
measures." (347)'®'' Although the Specifying Measures are extemal and 
given to the Specified Measure, the Specified Measure nevertheless is 
"a complete self-subsistent something." (347)'®® Meanwhile, the two 
extremes of this something are each repulsed "into distinct self-
subsistent somethings whose qualitative nature and subsistence 
(materiality) lies in their measure determinateness." (347)'®® 
II. REAL MEASURE 
Specified Measure (indifferently called the Ratio of Measures or 
Realized Measure) is by now "a correlation of measures," (348)'®'' and it 
was precisely this correlation that constituted the quality of the 
empirical something. The fate of this correlation now occupies our 
attention. Thus, whereas the first chapter in Measure was prepositional 
{i.e., the province of the Understanding), the current chapter is dialectic 
158 "Das Mal3 hat sich dahin bestimmt, ein spezifiziertes GroBverhaltnis zu sein, das als 
qualitativ das gewohnliche auBerliche Quantum an ihm hat." [1:357]. 
159 "[E]in unveranderlicher Exponent." [1:357]. 
160 "[U]nmittelbares. auBerliches, und als in sich spezifiziertes." [1:357]. 
161 "[D]as Mal3 nun auf diese Weise realisiert ist." [1:357]. 
162 "[S]eine Selbstbestimmung ist darin negiert." [1:358]. 
163 "[A]n jenem erst in Wahrheit die qualitative Bestimmheit." [1:358]. 
164 "[Rjeales Fiirsichsein, die Kategorie eines Etwas, als Einheit von QualitSten, die im 
MaBverhaltnisse sind." [1:358]. 
1®5 "[E]ine voile Selhstandigkeit." [1:358]. 
166 "[ijn unterschiedene Selbstandige, deren qualitative Natur und Bestehen (Materialitat) in 
ihrer MaBbestimmtheit liegt." [1:358]. 
167 "Beziehung von MaBen." [1:358]. 
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in nature.'®^ 
In Specified Measure, relations concerned "abstract qualities like 
space and time." (348)'^^ These were earlier said to be inseparable. 
(342) Now concepts like specific gravityand chemical properties 
take the stage.i'^^ These are "determinations characteristic of material 
existence." (348)'^^ Because the Ratio of Measures is the puck over 
which two resiliant Measures face off, the Measures can now be 
considered separable and, eventually, entirely dispensable from the 
middle term. 
Hegel begins by summarizing the crosses to be borne and the perils 
to ensue. Real Measure is first "a self-subsistent measure of a material 
Harris and Mure frankly proclaim the second chapter of Measure in the Science of Logic to 
be incomprehensible and aimounce that they will analyze the simpler discussion of the Lesser 
Logic only. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 145; MURE, supra note 1, at 121-22. Another commentator 
suggests Hegel's contributions to natural science have not been well received: 
On the one hand, natural scientists considered Hegel's Philosophy of Nature to be 
hocus-pocus, drastically contradicted by the progress in chemistry and physics, and 
discredited all passages of Hegel's Science of Logic in which models from the 
Philosophy of Nature played a role. On the other hand, philosophers tried to keep the 
Science of Logic independent of every specific material that had become obsolete by 
scientific progress. 
Ulrich Ruschig, Logic and Chemistry in Hegel's Philosophy, 7 INT'L J. PHIL. CHEMISTRY 5, 6 
(2001). John Burbidge, however, provides a lengthy and sympathetic account of this chapter. He 
reports that the chapter was substantially revised in the 1831 edition of the Science of Logic, to 
account for new developments in chemistry since 1813. JOHN W. BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, 
supra note 12, at 56-58. 
169 "[AJbstrakten Qualitat wie dem Raume und der Zeit." [1:358]. 
l''" Specific gravity, it will be recalled, is the ratio of (a) the density of a substance to (b) the 
density of some other substance, when both densities are obtained by weighing the substances in 
air. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. 
121 Clark Butler suggests that the first chapter of Measure concerned physics, while the second 
chapter stands for chemistry. He puts it this way: 
The Logic distinguishes between ideal measurement by stipulated units of a universal 
physical variable (such as force) and real measurement by natural units of a particular 
element of compound (such as water or salt). Ideal measures are found in physics, real 
measures in chemistry. Chemistry distinguishes particular material compounds, while 
physics (mechanics) distinguishes universal properties of matter everywhere. 
BUTLER, supra note 62, at 112. It must be added, however, that "real measures" are also ideal. 
On the law of sublation, we have been in the realm of the ideal ever since True Infinity arrived 
upon the scene. As for "natural units" in chemistry, Butler has in mind atoms—a dangerous 
claim, since Hegel was vociferously anti-atomic, even in chemistry. See infra text accompanying 
note 250. 
'22 " Bestimmungen materieller Existenzen sind." [1:358]. Hegel finished the first chapter of 
Measure by defining materiality as "qualitative nature and subsistence." (347) ("qualitative Natur 
und Bestehen") [1:358]. 
Space and time are not now divorced from these considerations. They are still moments, 
"but their relationship no longer depends simply on their own nature because they are now 
subordinated to further determinations." (348) ("die aber nun, weitem Bestimmungen 
untergeordnet, nicht mehr nur nach ihrer eigenen Begriffsbestimmung sich zueinander 
verhalten"). Hegel gives the example of soimd. In sound, there is the time in which vibrations 
occur and the spatial element of the length and thickness of the thing that vibrates. Any 
magnitude these considerations enjoy is determined externally. That is, fortune's finger must 
sound a stop on the pipe if we are to hear a note of music. 
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thing which is related to others." (348)i" The Real Measure specifies 
these others as well as being specified by them.'^'^ These Specifying 
Measures are in turn specified, and so an entire infinite series of 
Measures is always invoked. "[S]pecific self-subsistence does Mt 
continue as a single direct relation but passes over into a specific 
determinateness which is a series of measures." (348)'" 
A direct relation nevertheless exists. These unique, exclusive 
measures are "Elective Affinities," which will be discussed later. 
When opposing Measures are each viewed as Elective Affinities, each 
Measure can sustain a certain amount of quantitative change without 
undergoing qualitative change. But eventually, qualitative change 
ensues Hegel calls this face-off of quantitative properties, as limited by 
qualitative change, the Nodal Line. The Nodal Line yields the 
Measureless and "the infinity of measure. In this, the self-exclusive and 
self-subsistent measures are one with each other." (349)'" In other 
words. Measure escapes its servitude to externality, "and the self-
subsistent measure enters into a negative relation with itself. (349) ^ 
173 ' "fElin selfstandiges MaE einer Korperlichkeit, das sich zu andem verhalt." [1:359]. Ulrich 
Ruschig complains that the materiality to which Real Measure is applied is simply assumed sub 
silentio, neither derived nor derivable from prior categones, such as Pure Being. Ruschig snpra 
note 168 at 7. But this overlooks the fact that Pure Being is material. See ERROL E. HARRIS 
THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL 119 (1993) ("Being is the actual existing world as well as a logieal 
category."). This material is rendered ideal at the end of Detrerminate Being. We now have 
merely the thought of materiality to whieh the thought of Measure is applied. Not mere y 
assumed, materiality is the residue of Pure Being and hence is derived To be sure, there is the 
"givenness" of the beginning of the Logic, which Hegel concedes and carefully discusses. 
David Gray Carlson, The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning in Hegel s Science of Logic (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript). Ruschig means something different in his cnticism, which cannot be 
judged as well taken. • , j- . . 
174 What makes the Measure "real"? Professor Butler suggests that the ehemicals dictate their 
own proportions and therefore can be considered "natural units." BUTLER, j«pra note 62, at 113. 
In physics, which involved inseparable time and space, there were no natural units. Since force 
and other physical variables vary continuously in quantity, there is no objective unit of force. 
Butler implies here that time or space are infinitely divisible, so that the unit of time—hour or 
second—is conventionally chosen. Hegel did say in general, however, that space is an external, 
real whole as sueh—hence amount—whereas time, like volume, is the ideal, negative factor, the 
side of unitv " (342) ("auBerliches, reales Ganzes Uberhaupt, somit Anzahl, die Zeit hingegen, wie 
das Volumen, ist das Ideelle, das Negative, die Seite der Einheit.") [1:352]. For clanfication, see 
rwpra text accompanying notes 131-34. u 
175 "[D]ie spezifische Selbstandigkeit bleibt nicht in einem direkten Verhalmisse bestehen, 
sondem geht in spezifische Bestimmtheit, die eine Reihe von MaBen ist, uber." [1:359]. 
176 Elective Affinity will stand for the neutral "third" Measure that two diverse Measures 
produce when brought into juxtaposition. 5ee m/ra text accompanying notes 231-38. 
177 "[D]ie Unendlichkeit des MaBes ein, in welcher die sich ausschlieBenden Selbstdndigkeite 
Einsmiteinandersind." [1:359]. ,, n 
178 "[U]nd das Selbstandige in negative Beziehung zu sich selbst tntt. [l:Jsyj. 
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A. The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures 
The Measures have become self-subsistent. This is a sign that 
Quantity has recaptured its Quality. We are on the verge of checking 
out from the transient hotel of Being altogether, in order to take up a 
permanent self-subsistence in the realm of Essence, where "things" 
endure over time. 
Measures are actually relations of Measures, which are themselves 
relations of Measures. They are "physical somethings" and "material 
things." (349)'^' In this first section of Real Measure, the relation 
undergoes three changes, (a) At first, the relation is immediate. It is 
separate from its extremes (the Specifying Measmes). (b) These 
separate Measures, however, are also quantitative, which means they 
continue on into the relation which is their middle term, (c) The 
quantitative aspect of these Measures represents the range of 
quantitative change each Measure can undergo without suffering 
qualitative change. Each Measure is a series facing another series in a 
determinate way. Hegel calls this Elective Affinity. Here Measure's 
indifferent willingness to be externally applied to other Measures 
becomes exclusive to certain others and hence a qualitative Being-for-
self. 
1. Combination of Two Measures 
The ensuing section on combination of measures is exceptionally 
mysterious. It stands for the externality inherent in the idea of 
combination. Thus, the measurer combines substances, which, like 
school children at a cotillion, are indifferent to the choice of a partner. 
In the preview just prior to this section, Hegel writes of the combined 
measures that each is self-subsistent. Each "exists apart in particular 
things and their combination is effected externally^ (349)'®° Hence, as 
this section stands for the move of Understanding, we will draw Figure 
20(a) as follows: 
179 "[EJtwas, physikalische ... matierelle Dinge." [1:359]. 
180 "[BJestimmt sind, auBereinander an besondem Dingen bestehend, und werden aufierlich in 
Verbindung gesetzt." [1:359-60]. 
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Figure 20(a) 
Combination of Measures 
I am interpreting the lesson here to be that, at first, Measure is 
always a compound of other Measures. At this level, measure is 
alienated from the true nature of the thing measured. 
Hegel begins by reminding us that a thing is both a relation of 
Measures and itself a Measure. As a Measure, it is a unity between 
what is internal and what is extemal. Inwardness (or being-within-seip 
is exemplified by weight, if weight is taken intensively. Meanwhile, if 
the thing has multiple parts, this multiplicity is extensive—or "for 
other." 
The internal, intensive side is joined to an extemal appearance— 
"the abstract, ideal element of space." (349)i8i The extemal appearance 
is quantitatively determined (and space, it will be recalled, is Pure 
Quantity itself).>^2 jhe relation of these extemal qualities—their 
negative unity—"constitutes the qualitative nature of the material 
something." (349-50)'This appears to mean that the measurer, who 
joins the extemal qualities together in a quantitative way, puts them 
together in a Measure, but a unity transcending the Measure constitutes 
the tme quality of the thing. Hegel aims here, I think, at the negative 
constitution of things that will be emphasized in the doctrine of 
Essence.'^"* 
181 "[D]as Abstrakte, Ideele, der Raum." [1:360]. 
182 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2030-31. 
183 "[M]acht die qualitative Natur des materiellen Etwas aus." [1:360]. 
184 Ulrich Ruschig draws a different conclusion. He thinks that Hegel is claiming that specific 
weight (or density) is more "real" than the Ratio of Measures in Figure 19(c). Ruschig cnticizes 
this position: . . 
Yet it is doubtful if the transition to the "real" and allegedly more intnnsic measure can 
be regarded as a step in the logic of measuring without referring to a particular 
material. It is also doubtful if there is a merely logical reason that the direct ratio of 
mass and volume is the correct one for such a measuring. 
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Specific gravity—the ratio between weight and volume—is given 
as an example of Figure 20(a). Weight is portrayed as more authentic to 
the thing than volume. As proof, Hegel points out that, when two 
indifferent substances—say, gold and silver—are mixed together, the 
weight of the combination is the sum of the two weights mixed with one 
pound of gold and one pound of silver weighs two pounds. 
This is not so with volume. Volume is spatial, and Hegel names 
this the ideal aspect of the thing. Why ideal? It will be recalled that 
ideality stands for reduction to thought. An ideality was thus defined at 
the end of Determinate Being as, in effect, the mere memory of a 
moment that has passed away through sublation.'®^ 
If we consider a physical object as constructed of molecules 
whizzing about but somehow held together by Attraction in a shape— 
this object is mostly space (or Repulsion) and very little "substance."^^® 
The space infiised between the molecules of a thing cannot be 
perceived. It is negative, and negative things are deduced, not 
perceived. Space is simply a thought and hence ideal, not "real." 
To prove that space is ideal, Hegel invokes again the admixture of 
two indifferent substances. Perhaps if we add a pound of gold to a 
pound of silver, we have an alloy that weighs two pounds. But if we 
add a cup of gold to a cup of silver, we get less than two cups. The joint 
volume of a compound may be less than the sum of the individual 
substances. This is true because the substance is a mixture of material 
and non-material—or empty and filled space. Hence, when liquid gold 
is added to liquid silver, some of the silver atoms slip into the space that 
pure gold would have preserved, so that the joint volume is less than the 
sum of the individual volumes.'®^ 
Not only is space-volume taken as ideal, it is also to be taken as 
Unit. Why is this so? Recall that, in the early career of Quantity, the 
part of Number that was Amount and the part that was Unit were 
arbitrarily designated by the mathematician. Apparently measurers 
Ruschig, supra note 168, at 10. Ruschig suggests, to the contrary, that density fails to 
characterize the complete truth of a substance. "[C]haracterization by external comparison turns 
out to be superficial," he writes. Id. I think this is precisely Hegel's point. 1 don't think Hegel is 
saying that density is closer to measuring the real thing than Rule was, which produced the Ratio 
of Measures in Figure 19(c). Rather, in density (used by Hegel as a mere example of Real 
Measure) an external force is necessary to accomplish the measuring, but there is some unique 
quantity in the measured material which is truly essential to the thing. The thing is not totally 
open to outside manipulation. Hegel is working on bringing out into the open this "measureless" 
essence of the thing. He is not trying to measure the measureless, as Ruschig implies. 
185 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 546-48. 
186 On Attraction and Repulsion (the constituent parts of Quantity), see Carlson, Quality, 
supra note 9 at 569-84. Figures 10(a)-(c) in the appendix illustrate the relationship between 
Attraction and Repulsion. 
187 Later, Hegel will criticize such naive descriptions as 1 have provided for assuming the 
existence of atoms without metaphysical proof. (360) I am imdoubtedly guilty as charged. My 
point simply is that solid objects are made up mostly of empty space. 
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have no such discretion accorded to them. 
I think space's status as Unit reflects the negative constitution of 
things. Hegel has just said that the negative unity of qualities composed 
by the measurer was the qualitative nature of the thing. "Unit" stands 
for Discreteness, content, being, etc. All these concepts tended to the 
(negative) right side of the page early in Quantity. Now the thing is 
conceived as Ratio—a negative unity of independent Measures. This 
negativity is to be equated with space—and with the ideality of things in 
general. Volume-space is therefore the "being" of the material thing. It 
is to be taken as leaning to the (positive) left of the page. Thus, Hegel 
remarks that "it is space itself which constitutes the subsistence of 
matter in its external separated existence." (351)'^^ 
If volume is Unit because it is spatial, extensive, external, and 
subjective, then weight (in specific gravity) is Amount. This is the 
intensive aspect of the thing, "which manifests [the thing] 
quantitatively." (350)'^^ For instance, a cubic inch of gold weighs 19.3 
times as much as one cubic inch of water, when water is at its maximum 
density at 4° C, and when the densities of both gold and water are 
obtained by weighing the substances in air. Hence, we can say that for 
every imit (i.e., cubic inch of water), gold manifests itself by the unique 
amount of 19.3. Quantity is therefore intrinsic to the physical object. 
Nevertheless, this Amount, although intrinsic, is negative, because 
negativity is the constitution of all things. Gold is not inherently 19.3, 
but is so only under very specified conditions to which gold itself is 
indifferent. Hence, Amount leans to the right of the page. 
Here we have no Ratio of Powers, however. Ratio of Powers stood 
for the relation that is immune from manipulation of the mathematician. 
So long as the exponent 16 stayed fixed in = 16, x determined itself 
as {4,-4}. 
This cannot be said of specific gravity. Nothing inherent in gold 
requires its comparison to a cubic inch of water at 4° C. Hegel says of 
Measures like specific gravity that 
with the self-subsistence of the material thing immediacy has 
retumed and in this the specific magnitude is an ordinary quantum 
whose relation to the other side is likewise determined as the 
ordinary exponent of a direct ratio. (350)'®" 
Why has immediacy retumed? I think this means that the Measure 
of the thing is a negative unity of diverse Measures brought together 
188 "[D]er Raum selbst macht das Bestehen der auBereinanderseienden Materie aus." [1:362], 
189 "[D]as in quantitativer Betimmtheit." [1:360], 
190 "[D]a6 in der SelbstSndigkeit des Fursichsiens (materiellen Seins) die Unmittelbarkeit 
zurUckgekehrt ist, an welcher die GrdBebestimmtheit ein QuanUim als solches, und das Verhaltnis 
eines solchen zu der andem Seite ebenfalls in dem gewdhnlichen Exponenten eines direkten 
Verhaltnisses bestimmt ist," [1:360], 
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externally to define the thing. Of course, the Measures are diverse and 
subjectively chosen, but the fact that the unity of them is the thing 
suggests that the thing is immediate. That is, if the Measures are 
stripped away and the mediating unity alone is considered, this unity is 
an immediacy. Yet, in any such immediacy, the thing is at the mercy of 
the measurer. For that reason, we do not have the Ratio of Powers 
before us but highly manipulated quanta of the sort that we witnessed in 
Direct Ratio. 
The intrinsic Quantum of gold, to continue with that example, is an 
"immediate quantum," (350)'^' and it is specific to the thing. But it is 
likewise determined "only in the comparison with other exponents of 
such ratios." (350)'92 fjgre Hegel apparently emphasizes the 
conventionality of Measure. Earlier, Hegel remarked that it is "foolish 
to speak of a natural standard of things." (334)'^^ Universal standards 
of measure are merely conventional—"a matter of complete 
indifference." (334)^^"^ Here, Hegel seems to be saying that specific 
gravity is conventional, but it likewise captures the actual thing which 
actually manifests itself quantitatively. Thus: 
The exponent constitutes the specific intrinsic determinedness, the 
inner characteristic measure of something; but because this its 
measure rests on a quantum, it too is only an external, indifferent 
determinateness. (350)'^^ 
Hence, gold's unique weight of 19.3 becomes something entirely 
different if comparison of gold is to another metal (i.e., mercury) rather 
than water at 4° C. Accordingly, the intrinsic magnitude of the thing is 
alterable. 
As the section heading indicates, specific gravity is "The 
Combination of Two Measures" (349)'^^ A cubic inch of water at 4° C 
(Unit) with the weight of 1 (Amount) is one Measure that faces off 
against gold, the second Measure, which has the same Unit (cubic inch) 
but a different Amount (19.3). In this encounter, "each of the two 
measures, just because it is a measure, preserves itself in the alteration 
which it ought to suffer through the externality of the quantum." 
(350)'^'^ Thus, self-preservation is "an alteration of the measure itself 
191 "[U]nmittelbares Quantum." [1:360]. 
192 "[I]st nur in der Vergleichimg mit andem Exponenten solcher Verhaltnisse bestimmt." 
[1:360]. 
193 "Es ist daher toricht, von einem naturlichen MaBstabe der Dinge zu Sprechen." [1:344]. 
194 "[I]st es vollig gleichgiiltig." [1:344]. 
195 "Ej. macht das spezifische Ansichbestimmtsen, das innere eigentiimliche MaB von etwas 
aus; aber indem dieses sein MaB auf dem Quantum beruht, ist es auch mn als auBerliche, 
gleichgultige Bestimmtheit." [1:360-61]. 
196 "Verbindung zweier MaBe." [1:360]. 
197 "Einerseits erhalt sich nun jedes der beiden MaBe in der Veranderung, die an dasselbe 
durch die AuBerlicbkeit des Quantums kommen solte, weil es MaB ist." [1:361]. 
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and nevertheless "a reciprocal specification." (350)>98 Yet, "this self-
preservation is itself a negative relation toward this quantum. (350)'^^ 
In other words, there is some quantitative aspect of gold which is not 
19.3. Whatever this unnameable Quantity is, it is quite alienated from 
19.3. Yet, this Quantity likewise specifies 19.3, when gold and water 
are compared. Measure, then, is simultaneously a liar and a truth-teller 
about things. 
Hegel has not finished with weight and volume (the sides ot the 
ratio known as specific gravity). If a substance were only quantitatively 
determined, the admixture of two equal units of two different substances 
should double their weight and volume. Weight is doubled but volume 
is not. ,. • f 
That weight is doubled is evidence that weight is "a real being-tor-
self and "fixed determinate being" of the substance. (351)2oo But even 
weight's exponent is subject to alteration, since the exponent expresses 
the qualitative aspect of the compound. Hegel has already said that the 
qualitative aspect of material things is the unity of their external parts. 
This appears to mean that the substance can undergo quantitative 
change without undergoing qualitative change. The quality of a 
substance is therefore its indifference toward its outward quantitative 
measure. Accordingly, Hegel writes, "The exponents, however, are 
subject to alteration since they are the expression of the qualitative 
aspect of the compound." (351)^^' 
Weight, then, does not, after all, represent the immanent 
determining of the quantitative element of the thing. Immanence is in 
fact on display with regard to volume, even though the volume of the 
compound is exempt from the rigor of addition. Its indifference to 
addition suggests that volume is not the "real being-for-self'202 of the 
substances. Nevertheless, Being-for-self is precisely the non-
immanence of a thing's content.203 Volume represents immanence 
because "it is space itself which constitutes the subsistence of matter in 
its external separated existence." (351)2°'' jn other words, what subsists 
in a Measure is its negativity to outward Measure—negative space. 
198 "fEline Veranderung des Mafies selbst und zwar eine gegenseitige Spezifikation." [1:361]. 
199 "[AJndererseits aber ist dieses Sicherhalten selbst ein negatives Verhalten zu diesem 
Quantum." 
200 "mjiefursichseiendezumfestenDasein." [1:361]. 
201 "Aber in die Exponenten fallt die VerSnderung, indem sie der Ausdruck der qualitativen 
Bestimmtheit, des Fursichseins als MaBverhaltnisse sind.". [1:361]. Hegel also says that weight is 
"the number or amount of material parts," from the quantitative point of view. (351) ( [UJie 
Menge der materiellen Telle." [1:361]). Perhaps this likewise means that the perceived number ot 
pounds or grams that a substance yields is external to the thing that is being weighed. 
202 See Figure 8(a). 
203 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 570-89. . „ r,.,£oi 
204 "[D]er Raum selbst macht das Bestehen der auBereinanderseienden Matene aus. [1:362]. 
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Being negative, subsistence "lacks intrinsic being. (351)^1'^ 
Evidence of this is that the quantitative volume of the compound is 
"subject to alteration." (351)2«^ The upshot of "this toanent 
determining of the quantitative element" in volume is that "space is 
posited as what it truly is, an ideal being." (351)2"^ That is, space is not 
a real being but simply the thought of a past moment of the substance. 
That it is merely an absence is why addition does not apply. 
Volume and weight are the qualitative sides of material things. 
Volume is inherently alterable, and so addition does not apply to it. But 
even weight is alterable. Things on earth weigh something different 
when they are transported to the moon. "[Mjeasure itself—and so too 
the qualitative nature of the something based on it—has shown that it is 
unstable in its own self." (351)2o« Measure "has its determmateness m 
othermeasure relations." (351)209 
The lesson to be drawn from "The Combination of Two 
Measures," I think, is that all things have a Measureless aspect that 
escapes merely external Measure. But Hegel does not wish to coiKcde 
that there is an unknowable thing-in-itself in the mamer of Kant. 
Measure says something true about the thing as well, which will be the 
contribution of Dialectical Reason in the next section. 
2. Measure as a Series of Measure Relations 
Metonymy is the theme of this new section's tongue. Metonymy is 
the inability to name the thing directly—but only the context of the 
thing. In metonymy, if the entire context is described, the unnameable 
thing becomes a ghostly space the existence of which is simply inferred 
from context.210 As Slavoj Zizek puts it: 
The "oneness" of a thing is grounded not in its properties, but in the 
negative synthesis of a pure 'One' which excludes (relates negatively 
to) all positive properties: this "one" which guarantees the identity of 
a thing does not reside in its properties, since it is ultimately its 
205 "[i]st das nicht an sich Seiende." [1:362], 
206 "fDlas Veranderliche." [1:362]. , . t j  n " 
207 "[D]er Raum wird auf diese Weise als das, was er wahrhaft ist, als das Ideelle gesetzt. 
208^ "[S]ondem das Mafi selbst und damit die darauf gegrundete qualitative Bestimmtheit. 
[1:362]. , , u " 
209 "fsieine Bestimmtheit in andem MaBverhaltnissen zu haben. [1.J62J. 
210 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, in LAW ™ 
POSTMODERN MiND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 157-65 (Peter 
Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal 
E^of Wealth MMation, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 763 ("[I]n metonymy, the signified 
always remains hidden, and negative. ). 
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signifier?^' 
In the current section, Hegel suggests that a thing is ultimately the 
series of quanta produced when the thing is measured by all the other 
things that surround it. The thing is therefore a vacant place that is 
beyond direct, unmediated knowledge, but nevertheless indirectly 
knowable. Although Hegel does not invoke the word metonymy, I 
hazard the view that metonymy is now our theme. Figure 20(b) 
becomes: 
Figure 20(b) 
Measure as a Series of Measure Relations 
Shakespeare's Ulysses, in praise of degree, says: "Take but degree 
away, untune that string. And, hark, what discord follows! each thing 
meets In mere oppugnancy."^'^ HegeP'^ confirms this insight: 
If two things forming a compound body owed their respective 
specific natures only to a simple qualitative determination, they 
would only destroy each other when combined. (351)^"* 
It is the quantitative element that permits a thing to survive 
combination. The quantitative element is therefore key to self-
sub SI stciic 6 
Yet, self-subsistence is immanent to the thing. Therefore, self-
subsistence requires that the thing be combinable with another thing. 
That is, the one Measure is affected quantitatively by the other Measure 
and yet remains what it is qualitatively. In addition, its quantitative 
manifestation is unique to the thing. Hence, Hegel writes, the thing's 
"quality is masked in the quantitative element and is thus also 
indifferent towards the other measure, continuing itself in it and in the 
newly formed measure." (352)2i5 The thing, then, both contributes to 
211 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE—OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH 
FIGHTING FOR? 51-52 (2000). 
212 SHAKESPEARE, note 132, act 1, sc. 3. 
213 An ardent admirer of Shakespeare, incidentally. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A 
REINTERPRETATION 253 (1978); T.M. Knox, The Puzzle of HegeVs Aesthetics m ART AND 
LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY 1, 4 (Warren Steinkraus & Kenneth 1. Schmitz eds., 
see HORST ALTHAUS, HEGEL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 210 (Michael Tarsh trans., 2000) 
(Hegel thought Shakespeare was artistically confused). 
214 "Wenn etwas, das mit anderm vereint wird, und ebenso dies Andere, nur durch die "nfache 
Qualitat bestimmt, das ware, was es ist, so wurden sie in dieser Verbindung nur sich aufheben. 
215 "Seine Qualitat ist eingehullt in das Quantitative; damit ist sie ebenso gleichgultig gegen 
das andere MaB, kontinuiert sich in dasselbe und in das neue gebildete MaB hinein." [1:362]. 
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and escapes detection of its Measure. 
Hegel writes of a Specified Measure being taken by a measurer 
who imposes yet another (Specifying) Measure on it. The result is a 
predictable Quantum which is nevertheless external to the "true" 
Measureless thing. 
The exponent of the new measure is itself only some quantum or 
other, an extemal determinateness, and its indifference finds 
expression in the fact that the specifically determined thing effects, 
in association with other such measures, precisely similar 
neutralizations of the reciprocal measure relations. (352)216 
Here, Hegel is denying that Measure is an arbitrary Quantum, as Figure 
20(a) insisted. Rather, it contributes to a unique middle term between 
the two Measures which nevertheless fails to express the true being of 
the Specified Measure completely.^i' 
Hegel in this section emphasizes that it takes two sub-Measures to 
produce a third externally observable Measure. Yet, neither constitutive 
sub-Measure is entirely reflected in the observable third Measure. 
Nevertheless, the observed Quantum is a true statement of the Ratio of 
Measures.218 And, further, every Measure has a series of unique quanta 
that relates it to any given Measure the measurer cares to bring forth. 
A Series of Measures defines a thing's relation to other Measures; 
"This combination with a number of others which are likewise measures 
within themselves, yields different ratios which therefore have different 
exponents." (352)21^ Only when a self-subsistent Measure is compared 
to some other Measure does its unique exponent make itself apparent. 
216 "[D]er Exponent des neuen MaBes ist selbst nur irgendein Quantum, aufierliche 
Bestimmtheit, stellt sich als Gleichgiiltigkeit darin dar, daC das spezifisch bestimmte Etwas mit 
andem ebensolchen Mafien ebendergleichen Neutralisierungen der beiderseitigen 
MaCverhaltnisse eingeht." [1:362], 
212 There is a mysterious sentence in the Miller translation that is more elearly expressed in the 
Johnson-Struthers translation. Immediately after the most recent quote in the text, the Miller 
translation states: "[I]t is only one measure relation formed by itself and another specifieally 
determined thing that its specifie peculiarity is not expressed." (352) Johnston and Struthers put 
it this way: the "specific peculiarity [of a thing] fails to express itself when it and another form 
One only." 1 HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 371 (W.H. Johnston & E.G. Struthers trans., 1929) 
("in nur Einem, von ihm und einem andem Gebildeten driickt sich seine spezifische 
Eigentumlichkeit nicht aus" [1:362]). 
218 The truth, of course, is merely one-sided. Nevertheless, as Andrew Haas points out, "being 
is a result of measurement; that is, 'to be' means 'to already have a measure'—for being is merely 
an abstraction from concrete measurement, or a reduction and fixing of immeasurable 
singularity." ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 139(2000). In short, 
things are only to the extent they are measured by consciousness. 
It does not follow, however, as Ulrich Rusehig suggests, that "the quality of a substance 
can be characterized more precisely by comparing its initial density with the densities of its 
combinations with substances." Rusehig, supra note 168, at 11. Hegel is not aiming to define 
precise measurement. Rather, he is trying to show that, no matter how precise the measurement, 
there is a measureless aspect of a thing that escapes. 
219 "Diese Verbindung mit Mehrem, die gleichfalls MaBe an ihnen sind, gibt verschiedene 
Verhaltnisse, die also vershiedene Exponenten haben." [1:362-63]. 
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This exponent, however, is a "neutrality," not a direct expression of the 
real exponent. The thing (or its qualitative exponent) is, in effect, a 
series of neutral exponents. The qualitative exponent, Hegel says, is to 
be taken as the Unit of the series—its true qualitative being. 
Hegel warns against a misimpression: a self-subsistent Specified 
Measure (x) forms a series of exponents with a series of other Measures. 
Suppose this series is defined as X, with members X^j. Now imagine 
one of the Specifying Measures (y), which contributes one exponent 
(Xxy) to the set of X. The misimpression is that, just as X defines the 
Specified Measure (x), X also defines the Specifying Measure (y). This 
is not so, Hegel says. Rather, y has a series Y such that Y^y = X^. x and 
y have Yxy = X^y in common. "It is this alone ... which makes it 
possible to compare the two self-subsistent measures." (353)^20 
Furthermore, Hegel continues, as Specified Measure, x, is Unit and 
the series X (including Xfy) is amount. But from y's perspective as 
Specified Measure, y is Unit and the series is Amount. Furthermore, 
X and Y are each to be considered Units in and of themselves. Hence, x 
and y are "Amounts" in the Units X and Y. 
If the series X, for instance, is a Unit, then X itself refers to some 
other series X'xj, which is Amount to X-as-Unit but likewise Unit to 
some further Amount. Hence, there is an infinite regress—a Spurious 
Infinity—in "Measure as a Series of Measure Relations." As we are in 
a dialectic mode, we see our traditional undecidability between the 
extremes of Unit and Amount and also within each of the extremes in 
Figure 20(b). 
In this infinite regress, Hegel sees a return to Degree. The 
Specified Measure and also the series it generates are "simple or 
unitary." (354)^21 But, just as the 100th Degree was defined by the 
Extensive Magnitude outside it (1-99, 101-infinity), so the Specified 
Measure, as Unit, is defined by all the Measures outside such a 
Specified Measure. The Unit is surrounded by "a circle of quanta," 
(354)222 and each quantum is itself surrounded by a circle of quanta. In 
other words, the Specified Measure is a metonym. It cannot be known 
directly, but only by what it is not. Within these wheels-within-wheels 
"the self-determinedness of measure lies." (354)223 
220 "In ihr also liegt allein die Vergleichbarkeit der beiden Selbstandigen, die als sich nicht 
miteinander neutralisierend, sondem als gleichgOltig gegeneinander angenommen wurden." 
[1:363-64], 
221 "[Ejinfach zu sein." [1:364]. 
222 "Kreis von Quantis." [1:364], 
223 "[W]orin das Fursichbestimmtsein des MaBes liegt." [1:364]. In effect, I have intetpreted 
"Combination of Two Measures" as standing for the indifference of Specified to Specifying 
Measure, whereas "Measure as a Series of Measure Relations" stands for the dependence of a 
thing on Measure in general. The middle term will stand for the unity of indifference and 
dependence of things to their Measure. In contrast, Ruschig thinks that "Combination of Two 
Measures" stands for density of unchanged substances, while "Measure as a Series" stands for 
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Of these metonyms, Hegel writes, "Its self-relation is in the first 
place an immediate relation and therefore its indifference to an other 
consists only in the quantum." (354)^^"^ In other words, the quality of 
the thing is quantitative. Like a Quantity, its content is supplied by the 
circle of Measures that surrounds it. Nevertheless, Measure as Series is 
too advanced to be simply a Quantity indifferent to its own integrity; 
But this relation in which two specific measures specify themselves 
in a third something, the exponent, also implies that the one has not 
passed into the other; that therefore there is not only one negation, 
but that both are posited as negative in the relation. (354)225 
The Specified Measure, being a True Infinite, stays what it is even 
as it yields an appearance—the series that it generates.226 In this guise, 
the Specified Measure announees, "I am not any one of the quanta in 
the series." Yet, the Specifying Measure which generates the quantum 
in the Series is saying the same thing. It likewise says, "Neither am I 
the quantum in the Series that the Specified Measure generated." 
At this point. Speculative Reason intervenes to point out that each 
of the Measures—[1] and [3]—claims not to be the Series [2]. Yet, [2] 
is authentically each of the Measures. Hence, [1] and [3] have 




Of Figure 20(c), Hegel writes: "This their qualitative unity [2, 4] is 
neutralized (hence changed) substances. "Only if we refer to the chemical content, the logical 
transition is comprehensible as well as conclusive." Ruschig, supra note 168, at 7. Obviously, I 
disagree. Hegel is aiming for the metaphysics of Measure, for which density and stoichiometry 
are simply examples. Hegel may shift from examples pertaining to density to examples 
pertaining to stoichiometry, but this does not affect the integrity of his logic. 
224 "Seine Beziehung auf sich ist zunachst als unmittelbares Verhaltnis, und damit besteht 
sogleich seine Gleichgultigkeit gegen Anderes nur in dem Quantum." [1:365]. 
225 "Aber diese Beziehung, in welcher sich zwei Spezifische zu etwas, zu einem Dritten, dem 
Exponenten, spezifieren, enthalt femer dies, dafi das eine darin nicht in das andere ubergegangen, 
also nicht nur eine Negation uberhaupt, sondem beide darin negativ gesetzt sind." [1:365]. 
226 Enduring externality is this very feature that separates ordinary chemistry, which is a theme 
of Measure, from the super-advanced category of Chemism at the end of the Logic. See John W. 
Burbidge, Chemistry and Hegel's Logic, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 609-11. 
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thus a self-subsistent exclusive unit [7]." (354)22? YT\, which Hegel 
calls "the neutral relationship,"22^ proves that the exponents in the 
Series have a qualitative nature, reflecting the truth of the thing. 
Obviously, [7] is a Measure; Measure is quantitative as well as 
qualitative, and so [7] reflects that the difference between [1] and [3] is 
quantitative. Of this quantitative basis, Hegel says that the self-
subsistent Measure—^[1] or [3]—is indifferent to [7]. This indifference 
is the very quantitative basis that permits [1] or [3] to go outside itself 
and into [7]. 
To summarize, then, [1,2] and [2, 3] turned out to be the opposite 
of what they were supposed to be. The extremes renounced this middle 
term and held themselves aloof. But these extremes likewise have an 
affinity, because, without its other. Specified Measure could not 
manifest what it is. 
Although Hegel is very "chemical" in his discussion, his comments 
apply to love.229 A human being stands aloof from others but only 
manifests herself in the world in the eyes of others. Human personality 
is very much a Measure, which is why people alternate rivalry and 
aloofness with great affinity towards their true Measure.220 
3. Elective Affinity 
Affinity and neutrality refer to chemical relationships.221 "For a 
chemical substance has its specific determinateness essentially in its 
relation to its other and exists only as this difference from it." (355)222 
In other words, a substance is metonymic. It is nothing but a series of 
Measures, none of which captures the reality of the stuff. 
Accordingly, Affinity, as introduced in the last section, was not 
just affinity to some other substance but generally to the entire series of 
227 "Diese ihre qualitative Einheit ist somit fur sich seiende ausschlieCende Einheit." [1:365]. 
228 "[N]eutrale Beziehung." [1:365]. This will relate to chemical reactions in the next section. 
Thus, acids and alkali are mutually attractive, and their relation is "neutral" and "stoichiometric." 
See infra text accompanying notes 261-83. 
729 The connection between Elective Affinity and love was not lost on the Greeks. 
"Empedocles was of the opinion that the particles of the four elements—earth water, air, and fire, 
passed to and from one another by means of love and hatred." Cees de Pater, Newton and 
Eighteenth-Century Conceptions of Chemical Affinity, in HEGEL AND NEAVTONIANISM, supra 
note 4, at 619. 
230 I give this concept a more rigorous treatment in David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things 
With Hegel, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000). 
221 Goethe, Hegel's patron, also had a popular novel in 1809 entitled The Elective Affinities. 
See JoHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, ELECTIVE AFFINITIES (R.J. Hllingdale trans., 1971). For 
a review, see H.A.M. Snelders, The Significance of Hegel's Treatment of Chemical Affinity, in 
HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 631. 
232 "Denn in der chemischen Sphdre hat wesentlich das Materielle seine spezifische 
Bestimmtheit in der Beziehung auf sein Anderes; es existiert nur als diese Differenz." [1:365]. 
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all substances.233 series was nothing but the common quanta that 
the Specified Measure holds with each and every other Measure. 
Hence, the Specified Measure was indifferent amongst the many 
Measures to which it is compared. Simultaneously, each member of the 
series was itself an exclusive Measure between the Specified and 
Specifying Measure.^^'^ 
Elective affinity (Wahlverwandtschaff), however, singles out these 
exclusive Measures and proclaims some "better" than (or at least 
qualitatively different from) some of the others. "In elective affinity as 
an exclusive, qualitative correlation [7]," Hegel writes, "the relationship 
is rid of [its] quantitative difference." (355)235 In this series of exclusive 
relations, numbers have lost their continuity with each other. These 
relations are therefore qualitative (yet not entirely qualitative). 
How does Hegel derive this qualitative preference for one Measure 
over another? The derivation has to do with the ''extensive magnitude 
of the substances" in the series of Measures that define the metonymic 
thing. (355)236 Extensive Magnitude, it will be recalled, stood over 
against Degree. If Degree was, for instance, the 100th degree. 
Extensive Magnitude stood for 1-99 and 101 through infinity—^the 
external numbers implicitly excluded by the 100th degree and by which 
Degree is defined. But Extensive Magnitude and Degree ended up 
being the same thing. The 100th Degree had its Extensive Magnitude 
within it as well as without it. That followed because Degree was a 
True Infinite. All this was established in Figure 14(c) (the Quality of 
the Quantum).23'!' 
Intensity suggests that, of the series of neutralizing Measures that 
define the metonymic Specified Measure, the opposing Measures can be 
arranged according to the intensity with which they "neutralize" the 
Specified Measure. The Specifying Measures therefore differ in the 
quantity needed to neutralize, and this ends up being the very quality of 
the Specified Measure. 
The relation of a unique Specifying and Specified Measure is 
233 Hegel will later say that the Elective Affinities identify "a self-subsistent measure [that] 
relates itself to self-subsistent measures of a different quality and to a series as such." (367) ("ein 
Selbstandiges sich zu Selbstandigen anderer Qualitat und zu einer Reihe solcher verhalt, 
verschieden." [1:380]). 
234 Elective Affinity applies not only to chemistry but to music. Each musical note has 
meaning only in combination with the series of notes. The circle of notes is the composition 
itself. Any given note belongs to that composition but is likewise a "member in the system of 
every other key." (355). ("Glied im Systeme jedes andem Grundtons" [1:366]). The composition 
and the harmonies within it are Elective Affinity. The character of the composition, however, is 
dissolved if the "merely quantitative progression" (355) ("bloB quantitativen Fortgehens" [1:366]) 
is exalted over the qualitative "group being" of the whole. 
235 "In der Wahlverwandtschafl als ausschlieBender, qualitativer Beziehung entnimmt das 
Verhalten sich diesem quantitativen Unterschiede." [1:366]. 
236 "[£)]er extensiven GroBe, der unter den Gliedem." [1:366]. 
237 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2072. 
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exclusive and hence qualitative. Now the thing graduates to the 
relationship ... of more or less." (356)^^^ But there is still a sense in 
which the Specified Measure is indifferent whether it is neutralized by 
one rather than another Specifying Measure (even though the quantity 
necessary to neutralize differs). The qualitative relation of Elective 
Affinity is therefore still external and hence quantitative. 
a. Remark: Berthollet on Chemical Affinity and Berzelius's Theory 
ofit239 
Hegel now commences a long comment on theories of affinity 
from chemistry.240 As with his calculus commentaries,^^! ^^e fault he 
finds is that chemistry indaequately distinguishes Quantity and Quality. 
Certain chemical substances are attracted more strongly to certain 
substances than to others. This is evidence that the substance is 
incomplete. Such substances "strictly speaking do not exist for 
themselves but only as a tendency to get rid of their isolatedness by 
combining with another constituent." (357)242 Such chemical 
substances have a "quantitative mode of... relationship" (357)243 
which determines how much of one substance is needed to neutralize 
another. This quantitative aspect identifies the qualitative aspect of the 
substance. "[I]t makes it what it is on its own account and the number 
which expresses this is essentially one of several exponents" that could 
have been cited. (357)244 Sm;h substances have a measurable affinity 
for each other. 
The quantitative nature of these substances is what allows them to 
coexist. If their connection had been purely qualitative (as is the case of 
positive and negative electrical charges), the one side would be nothing 
but the negative of the other. The two sides could not then exhibit any 
indifference to or self-subsistence apart from the other. The quantitative 
aspect allows one substance to neutralize more than one other 
substance. Thus, an acid will neutralize many different alkali. In fact, 
one difference between acids is the quantity needed to neutralize a given 
238 "[D]as Mehr oder Weniger." [1:367], 
239 -iTiis Remark was added in the 1831 revision of the Science of Logic. BURBIDGE, REAL 
PROCESS, IWPRA note 12, at 65. 
240 Aecording to one commentary, for Hegel, "elective affinity is the cause of the origin of 
chemical substances." H.A.M. Snelders, The Significance of Hegel's Treatment of Chemical 
Affinity, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 631, 637. 
241 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2093-2138. 
242 "[E]igentlich nieht fur sich existieren, sondem nur diese Existenz haben, ihr isoliertes 
Bestehen aufzuheben und sich mit einem andem zu verbinden." [1:368]. 
243 "[D]er quantitativen Art und Weise des Verhaltens." [1:368]. 
244 "[S]ie macht ihn zu dem, was er fiir sich ist, und die Zahl, die dies ausdruckt, ist wesentlich 
einer von mehrem Exponenten." [1:368]. 
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alkali. If comparatively little of an acid is needed for the task, then we 
say that acid has a closer affinity than another which requires more. 
That acids can neutralize many alkali is proof that the acids have self-
subsistence, which is founded on the quantitative side of Measure.245 
Hegel considers various discoveries of chemistry. Thus, "if two 
neutral solutions are mixed resulting in dissociation followed by two 
new compounds, these products, too, are neutral." (357-58)246 Another 
law, which is supposed to "follow" from the one just stated is this; if it 
takes twice as much Alkali A to neutralize Acid A as it takes Alkali B to 
neutralize Acid A, then, this ratio of two-to-one will hold for Acid B.247 
Claude Louis Berthollet, a generation older than Hegel, worked on 
laws such as these; he had a theory of "chemical mass,"(358)248 which 
Hegel criticizes for eliminating the qualitative moment of exclusive 
elective affinity. A contemporary textbook in chemistry by Jons Jakob, 
Baron von Berzelius,249 is immortalized for its uncritical acceptance of 
Berthollet's theory, and for assuming the existence of atoms. In 
analyzing saturation, what matters is not atoms but comparative 
quantities. If there is to be any talk of atoms, then the existence of 
atoms must be proved, or at least corroborated, by metaphysics, "but 
this cannot confirm them any more than experience can—on the 
contrary! "(360)26o 
245 Why quantitative, when, in general, self-subsistence has been associated with the 
qualitative aspect? In the previous section, Hegel emphasized that the enduring feature of a 
thing—what exceeds the infinite set of measures—is its negativity. This negativity is quantitative. 
246 "[W]enn zwei neutrale Solutionen gemischt werden, wodurch eine Scheidung und daraus 
zwei neue verbindungen entstehen, diese Produkte gleichfalls neutral sind." [1:369]. This theory 
was discovered in 1792 by Jeremias Benjamin Richter. Snelders, supra note 238, at 639. 
247 See Ruschig, supra note 168, at 7. Hegel credits a Berlin colleague, Ernst Gottfried 
Fischer, for this discovery. (358). 
248 "[Cjhemischen Masse." [1:370]. Berthollet also favored "phlogiston" over Lavoisier's 
oxygen. Dietrich Von Engelhardt, Hegel on Chemistry and the Organic Sciences, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 657. 
249 Berzelius was a Swedish chemist nine years Hegel's junior. Snelders, supra note 231, at 
640. 
250 "[A]ber warden sie so wnig als durch der Ehrfuhrung bestatigt,—im Gegenteil!" [1:372]. 
Hegel was a harsh critic of atomism in both natural and ethical philosophy. See Carlson, Quality, 
supra note 9, at 564-66. In chemistry, Hegel, in the Philosophy of Nature, protests that atoms, as 
self-identities, are inconsistent with continuity, which will be emphasized in Figure 21(a). 
Burbidge, supra note 231, at 609. According to Burbidge: 
Although [atomism] certainly reduces chemical bodies into elements and distinguishes 
elements according to their atomic weight, it leaves the chemical process 
unexplained .. . The theory has moved from a sense of totality to its discrete moments, 
but it does not reconstitute the totality with which it began. It is, therefore, incomplete. 
Id. at 614; see also BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 71 (once atoms were seen as 
"minute fields of energy .. . they ceased to be atoms in the traditional sense of indivisible spheres 
of matter, and fitted more closely to the Hegelian perspective in which relations are as important 
as distinctions"). Hegel's contemporary, John Dalton, would produce a chemical theory 
involving atoms that was much different from the eighteenth century atomism that Hegel was 
criticizing. Wolfgang Bonispien, Newtonian Atomism and Eighteenth-Century Chemistry, in 
HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 595, 599, 608. Nevertheless, Birbidge comments 
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The fault of the chemists that Hegel criticizes is that elective 
affinity, which is qualitative, is reduced to quantitative difference. 
Meanwhile, when exclusive Elective Affinities are observed, these are 
ascribed to circumstance—"to determinations which appear as 
something external to the affinity." (361)^^' 
Chemical affinity has been distinguished from Elective Affinity. 
The latter is qualitative "whose behavior in no way coincides with the 
order of that series." (362)252 a confusion, however, arises with regard 
to electrical action and chemical action. Hegel chooses not to dwell on 
the matter because this confusion is not relevant to Measure as such.252 
Nevertheless the confusion "must be dubbed shallow, for shallowness 
consists in omitting the difference between distinct terms and then 
treating them as identical." (362)25^ Hegel pronounces Berzelius s 
equation of the two "almost comical." (362)255 jj, this description, 
electricity is said to be the cause of chemical action, "but about the 
that Hegel's "conceptual problem with atomism ... blinded [him] to the way the simple 
progression of determinate propositions justified the belief in basic chemical units." BURBIDGE, 
REAL PROCESS, JMPRA, at 71. 
251 "[A]uf Bestimmungen, welche als etwas der Verwandtschaft AuBerliches. [1.373]. A 
comparison is made between the quantification of Elective Affinities and the analysis of 
pendulums. Gravity causes the pendulum to pass into a state of rest. But this is treated as caused 
by air resistance rather than gravity—again an external or circumstantial attribution. (362) The 
point here, according to one commentator, is that one should abstract from those physical factors 
with an ancillary effect on the motion of the pendulum and consider the pendulum as a 
mechanism directly dependent on gravity. Michael John Petry, Classifying the Motion: Hegel on 
the Pendulum, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 291, 311. 
252 "[D]eren Verhalten mit jener Ordnung keineswegs zusammenffillt." [1;374]. 
253 Hegel has already said that positive and negative electrical charges are purely qualitative, 
whereas chemical attraction is qualitative and quantitative—a Measure. For this reason, electrical 
charges have no subsistence in the absence of its opposite, but chemicals do. (357-58). Only after 
1800 are "the so-called imponderable substances—light, heat, magnetism and electricity... 
dropped from chemistry." Engelhart, 5upra note 248, at 657. 
254 "F(ir sich selbst ist sie seicht zu nennen, weil die Seichtigkeit dann besteht, das 
Verschiedene mit Weglassung der Verschiedenheit identisch zu nehmen." [1:374]. 
255 "[B]einahe komisch." [1:374]. Hegel pauses to denounce the practice of deferring to the 
great prestige of scientists as a reason not to subject their theories to criticism: 
The merit and fame which Berzelius has eamed by his theory of proportions, which 
has been extended to all chemical relations, ought not as such to be made a reason for 
not setting forth the weaknesses of this theory; but a more particular reason for doing 
so must be the circumstance that such merit in one aspect of a science, as with Newton, 
tends to become an authority for a baseless structure of spurious categories which is 
attached to it and that it is just this kind of metaphysics which is proclaimed and 
echoed too with the greatest pretension. (365). 
Das Verdienst und der Ruhm von Berzelius wegen der auf alle chemischen 
Verhaltnisse ausgedehnten Proportionenlehre dttrfte fur sich kein Abhaltungsgrund 
sein, die BloBe der angefuhrten Theorie auseinanderzusetzen; ein ndherer Grund aber, 
dies' zu tun, muB der Umstand sein, daB solches Verdienst in einer Seite der 
Wissenschaft, wie bei Netwon, Autoritat fur ein damit in Zusammenhang gesetztes 
grundloses Gebaude von schlechten Kategorien zu werden pflegt, und daB gerade 
solche Metaphysik dasjenige ist, was mit der groBten Pratension ausgegeben und 
ebenso nachgesprochen wird. 
[1:377]. 
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specifically chemical nature of the chemical process electricity tells us 
nothing." (363)^56 Hegel's basic assessment of the confusion is that 
electricity "is transient and remains external to the quality of 
substances." (363)25^ Chemical action "embraces and alters the entire 
qualitative nature of substances." (363)^^^ 
Chemicals have affinities, but, as Real Measures, they also have an 
independent existence. Certain Measures, however, "are inseparable 
and cannot be displayed in a separate and distinct existence of their 
own." (365)259 In specific gravity, weight and volume cannot be 
separated. To be sure, specific gravity involves external comparison— 
of some chemical to a cubic inch of water at 4° C. Hegel proposes, 
however, the project of finding the series of specific gravities of one 
substance against, not just water, but all the other substances.^^o 
B. Nodal Line of Measure-Relations 
In Elective Affinity (or neutrality), the exclusive and hence 
qualitative nature of the Specified Measure's relation to a Specifying 
Measure was emphasized. Yet, the Specified Measure had a series of 
Elective Affinities. How shall these separate moments be 
distinguished? They can be distinguished only quantitatively.^^! jhe 
amounts needed to neutralize the Specified Measure vary between the 
Elective Affinities. 
Because Elective Affinity (or neutrality) is quantitative, affinity 
continues into the other neutralities. Hence, we have; 
256 "[D]a6 die Elektrizitat die Ursache des chemischen Verhaltens sei, dafi aber die Elektrizitat 
uber das, was im chemischen Prozesse chemisch ist, keinen AufschluB gebe." [1:375]. 
257 "[F]luchtig ist und der Qualitat der Korper auBerlich bleibt." [1:375], 
258 "[D]ie ganze qualitative Natur der Korper in Anspruch nimmt und alteriert." [1:375]. 
259 "[U]ntrennbar sind und nicht in einer eigenen, voneinander verschiedenen Existenz 
dargestellt werden kdnnen." [1:378]. 
260 "The problem would be to recognize the exponents of the ratios of the series of specific 
gravities as a system based on a rule which would specify a merely arithmetical plurality into a 
series of harmonic nodes." (365) ("Es wdre die Aufgabe vorhanden, die Verhaltnisexponenten der 
Reihe der spezifischen Schweren als ein System aus einer Kegel zu erkennen, welche cine bloB 
arithmetische Vielheit zu einer Reihe harmonischer Knoten spezifizierte." [1:378]). Burbidge 
claims that these remarks look forward to Dimitri Mendeleev's periodic table later in the 
nineteenth century. BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 72. 
261 Hence, eighteenth century chemistry made tables of Elective Affinities a major research 
project. Snelders, supra note 238, at 640. 
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Figure 21(a) 
Continuity of Affinity 
Thus, to the extent we can arrange the Affinities quantitatively, this 
arrangement is externally imposed on them. Yet, externality "in the 
form of a comparison"(366)2^2 is not their only moment. Neutrality is 
''separable into the moments which united to produce it." (366)2^3 
Affinity may be continuous, but "it is as self-subsistent somethings that 
these [two Measures] enter into relation indifferently with one or the 
other of the opposite series, although combining in different, 
specifically determined amounts." (366-67)2^4 
Hence, says Dialectical Reason, not only is Affinity continuous, 
but it is "infected with its own indifference; it is in its own self 
something external and alterable in its relation to itself." (367)2^^ \Ye 
thus have a unity of Continuity and Indifference. 
Figure 21(b) 
Indifference of Affinity 
(Substrate) 
262 "[A]ls eine Vergleichung." [1:379]. 
263 "[A]ls solche eine Trennbarkeit in ihr." [1:379]. 
264 "[A]Is selbstandige Etwas, jedes als gleichgultig, mit diesem oder mit andem der 
gegenilberstehenden Reihe, obzwar in verschiedenen spezifisch bestimmten Mengen sich zu 
verbinden, in Beziehung treten." [1:379]. 
265 "[i]n ihm selbst beruht, mit eigner Gleichgiiltigkeit behaftet; es ist ein an ihm selbst 
Aufierliches und in seiner Beziehung auf sich ein Veranderliches." [1:379]. 
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Indifference represents the "relation to itself of the measure 
relation." (367)2^6 As such, it is qualitative, and it is important to note 
that this self-relation begins to appear at this stage on the right {i.e., 
negative) side of the page. This was already implicit when Measure as 
Series was placed on the right side. Measure as Series was likewise 
implicitly a metonym—an indifference to any given Measure but 
nevertheless the sum total of them all. Now we have an indifference to 
Measure that is posited, or, as Hegel says "affirmatively present." 
(367)26^ Furthermore, what is posited is what Being is not. This will be 
the quintessential character of Essence, which technically exceeds the 
scope of Measure but is already beginning to show itself here.^®^ 
This indifference is given an important new name. Hegel calls 
Indifference "a permanent, material substrate." (367)^®' The Substrate 
is a qualitative continuity, even as the outward appearance of a 
substance changes. To borrow one of Hegel's favorite examples,^'''' 
water becomes ice if its quantitative temperature falls too low, and it 
becomes steam if the temperature becomes too high. But, in all these 
quantitatively different states, it remains H2O. H2O may be considered 
the Substrate of all the various appearances of water in its liquid, solid 
or gaseous forms. 
The Substrate, however, is not unconnected with its Measure. It is 
"continuous" with it, as Figure 21(b) indicates. The Substrate "must 
contain in its quality the principle of the specification of this 
externality" in a Measure. (367)2'^' 
We are now in the dialectical mode, so we may expect that each of 
the extremes—[1] and [3]—denies [2] and thereby confirms [2] as its 
true being.272 Hegel confirms this: 
[T]he exclusive measure [1] as thus more precisely determined is 
external to itself in its being-for-self [2] and hence repels itself from 
itself, positing itself both as another measure relation and also as 
another, merely quantitative, relation; it is determined as in itself [2] 
a specifying unity which produces measure relations within itself. 
(367)2" 
266 "Die Beziehung des Verhaltnismafles auf sich." [1:379]. 
267 "[SJeiende." [1:379], 
268 In Essence, I will change our convention. In the realm of Being, the Understanding dragged 
the middle term over to the left the page—the side of being. But in the realm of Essence, the 
Understanding will drag the middle term over to the right—the side of Nothing. Reflection 
always signals what a thing is not (thereby showing what it is). 
269 "[B]leibendes, materielles Substrat." [1:379]. 
270 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 140 Remark. 
271 "[l]n seiner Qualitat jenes Prinzip der Spezifikation diese AuBerlichkeit enthalten miifite." 
[1:379]. 
272 See HAAS, supra note 216, at 155 (Measure "shows itself as the between of that which it 
seeks to exclude"). 
273 "Das ausschlieflende MaB nach dieser nahem Bestimmung nun, in seinem Fiirsichsein sich 
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This isolation of [2] as the essence of the extremes is our typical 
move of Speculative Reason. We therefore have: 
Figure 21(c) 
Nodal Line 
Figure 21(c) differs from Elective Affinity. The Elective Affinity 
of Figure 20(c) identified "a self-subsistent measure relat[ing] itself to 
self-subsistent measures of a different quality and to a series of such. 
At that point, the concept of Substrate had not yet been 
developed.2" NQW the series in Figure 21(c) is recognized as taking 
place "in one and the same substrate within the same moments of the 
neutrality." (367)^^6 Measure has become self-repelling, and it has 
exiled its quantitative Measures to the extremes, from which it is merely 
quantitatively different. The Substrate, then, organizes the series of 
Measures into "a nodal line of measures on a scale of more and less." 
(367)2" 
The Substrate is a being-for-self, which needs external quanta to 
express what it is. Because of this need, the Measure is "open to 
externality and to quantitative alteration." (367)2" Furthermore, it has 
inherited from the earlier stage of Rule the character that it has a range 
within which it remains indifferent to [quantitative] alteration and does 
not change its quality." (367)22^ 
auBerlich, stoBt sich von sich selbst ab, setzt sich sowohl als ein anderes, nur quantitatives, als 
auch als ein seiches anderes Verhaitnis, das zugleich ein anderes MaB ist,—ist als an sich selbst 
spezifizierende Einheit bestimmt, welche an ihr MaBverhaltnisse produziert. [E380]. 
274 "[E]in Selbstandiges sich zu Selbstandigen anderer Qualitat und zu einer Reihe solcher 
verhalt, verschieden." [1:380]). . , 
275 Bonispien, supra note 248, at 607 ("In his theory of elective affinity, [Hegel] seems to be 
operating without any presupposed substances. Since there is no chemical substratam, simp y a 
variety of chemical reactions, the chemical elements are regarded as being completely determined 
by means oftheir mutual inter-relationships."). 
276 "rA]n einem und demselben Substrate innerhalb derselben Momente der Neutralitat statt. 
[1:380]. This justifies Andrew Haas's remark: "If'exclusion' marks the elective affinities of se -
sufficient measures, then 'inclusion' marks them when they take on the form of a knotted 
l i n e  . . . . "  HAAS, S«PRA note 216, at 155. „ r, TQAI 
277 "[E]ine Knotenlinie von MaBen auf einer Skale des Mehr und Weniger. [1:380]. 
278 "[D]erAu6erlichkeit und der Quantumsveranderungoffen." [1:380], 
279 "[E]s hat eine Weite, innerhalb deren es gegen diese Veranderung gleichgultig bleibt und 
seine Qualitat nicht andert." [1:380]. 
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Because Measure has a range of quantitative change that invokes 
no qualitative change, "there enters a point in this quantitative alteration 
at which the quality is changed and the quantum shows itself as 
specifying, so that the altered quantitative relation is converted into a 
measure, and thus into a new quality, a new something." (367)2^0 
Quantitative change, then, leads to qualitative change. 
Nevertheless, underneath the qualitative change lies an indifferent 
Substrate. In qualitative change, the two qualities, Hegel says, have no 
connection. One is not the limit to the other. Each is completely 
external to the other. But a Substrate underlies all the changes. "The 
new something has therefore not emerged from or developed out of its 
predecessor but directly from itself." (367-68)2^i decisive point is 
that, "in this 'infinite progress' of a self-continuing nodal line one unity 
remains nonetheless, one 'self-sameness' constitutes itself. 
Meanwhile, the relation between the qualities is quantitative. This 
means that "the progress from one quality [to another] is in an 
uninterrupted continuity of the quality." (368)283 Yet, at some dramatic 
moment, nature leaps from one quality to another, even if the 
quantitative change is reassuringly gradual. Gradualness, however, is 
the opposite of qualitative change. In gradualness, the quality of the 
thing is indifferent to the quantitative change. 
1. Remark: Examples of Such Nodal Lines; the Maxim, 'Nature Does 
not Make Leaps' 
A nodal line is like a knotted string. Between the knots is 
quantitative difference, to which quality is indifferent. Each knot 
represents a qualitative change. "The system of natural numbers 
already shows a nodal line of qualitative moments which emerge in a 
merely external succession," Hegel writes. (368)28"' Each number in the 
line bears a quantitative relation to the one before or after it. But these 
numbers likewise have specific relations with specific numbers when 
the question is power or root. (This specific relation of a number and, 
say, its square root would be an Elective Affinity). 
280 "Aber es tritt ein Punkt dieser Anderung des Quantitativen ein, auf welchem die Qualitat 
geSndert wird, das Quantum sich als spezifizierend erweist, so daB das veranderte quantitative 
Verhaltnis in ein MaB und damit in eine neue Qualitat, ein neues Etwas, umgeschlagen ist." 
[1:380], 
281 "Es ist also nicht aus dem Vorhergehenden, sondem unmittelbar aus sich hervorgetreten." 
[1:380], 
282 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 66 (Seyla 
Benhabib trans,, 1987), 
283 "[D]er Fortgang von einer Qualitat in stetiger Kontinuitat der Quantitat ist," [1:380-81], 
284 "Das natiirliche Zahlensystem zeigt schon eine solche Knotenlinie von qualitativen 
Momenten, die sich in dem bloB auBerlichen Fortgang hervortun," [1:381], 
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The musical scale is a nodal line. A note is indifferent to the one 
before or after it, but, in harmony, the notes have specific relations with 
other notes, analogous to the specific relations between roots and 
powers. Thus, as one plays notes on the piano, each successive one 
seems unrelated to the one before, when "there suddenly emerges a 
return, a surprising accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of 
what immediately preceded it." (369)^^^ The harmony constitutes a 
sudden interruption of the succession of merely indifferent relations 
which do not alter the preceding specific reality [A] specific 
relation breaks in per saltum." (369)^^^ 
Qualitative leaps occur in chemical combinations. Water is a clear 
example of this. Water instantly freezes when it reaches 0° C. It "does 
not gradually harden as if thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying 
until it reach the consistency of ice." (370)^^^ "Every birth and death, 
far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is 
the leap from a quantitative to a qualitative alteration." (369-70)28^ 
This Remark ends with a blast at gradualness which is seemingly at 
odds with the early chapters on Being but, on further reflection, is not. 
It will be recalled that, in the Ought, Being ceases to be—a cessation 
which is the in-itself of Being. That is, the Finite ought to cease to be. 
This led efficiently to the True Infinite, which ceases to be what it was 
and yet remains what it was.289 Now, with regard to gradualness, Hegel 
complains it is based on the assumption that what comes to be is already 
actually in existence, but not yet perceptible because of its smallness. 
Under the rule of gradualness, "coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be lose all 
meaning." (370)290 The complaint seems to be that Being-in-itself is 
quantified in gradualist discourse, and quantification is, in Measure, the 
externalist position. Rather than denying the True Infinite here, Hegel 
is merely complaining that, in gradualism, the True Infinite undergoes 
change externally, not immanently. 
In the moral sphere, Hegel complains, this is harmful. Gradualness 
is a threat to morality. Stealing starts off being wrong, but perhaps the 
285 "[T]ut sich vielmehr auf einmal eine Ruckkehr, eine uberraschende Ubereinstimmung 
hervor, die nicht durch das unmittelbar Vorhergehende qualitativ vorbereitet war." [1:382]. 
286 "[D]er Fortgang an bloB gleichgultigen Verhaltnissen, welche die vorhergehende 
spezifische Realitat nicht andem,. . . bricht somit durch einen Sprung ein spezifisches Verhaltnis 
ein." [1:382]. This material on harmony was added in the 1831 edition of the Science of Logic. 
BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, note 12, at 57. 
287 "Das Wasser wird durch die Erkaltung nicht nach und nach hart, so daB es breiartig wurde 
und allmahlich bis zur Konsistenz des Eises sich verhartete, sondem ist auf einmal hart." [1:383]. 
The rendering of "breiartig" (pasty or viscous) into "like porridge" reveals more of Miller's 
poetic side more than it does Hegel's. 
288 "Alle Geburt und Tod sind, statt eine fortgesetzte Allmahlichkeit zu sein, vielmehr ein 
Abbrechen derselben und der Sprung aus quantitativer Veranderung in qualitative." [1:383]. 
289 See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 541. 
290 "Es wird damit das Entstehen und Vergehen Uberhaupt aufgehoben." [1:383]. 
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filching of bus fare is not a crime, and so on. "It is through a more and 
less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is exceeded and 
something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right 
becomes wrong and virtue vice." (371)^^' The point here is that, since 
gradualness represents the external position (not the immanent one), 
gradual change in morality subjectivizes the process. The reality of the 
situation—the radical change from the legal to the criminal—becomes 
obscured in quantitative measures. 
In the political sphere, Hegel suggests that nations too change 
quantitatively in terms of population. At a certain point, a eonstitution 
no longer suits the state. The state has undergone qualitative change 
which "renders it liable to instability and disruption under the same 
constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its 
expansion." (371)^^^ 
C. The Measureless 
In the Nodal Line, some relations to some Measures are exclusive 
and qualitative. Some are quantitative and inessential To the extent it 
is subject to quantitative manipulation, the underlying quality of the 
measure is indifferent. Yet, quantitative change is potentially lethal. 
"Magnitude is that side of determinate being through which it can be 
caught up in a seemingly harmless entanglement which can destroy it. 
(371)293 
The Understanding seizes upon this harmlessness of quantitative 
change and brings it front and center: 
291 "Es ist ein Mehr und Weniger, wodurch das MaB des Leichtsinns iiberschritten wird, und 
etwas ganz anderes, Verbrechen, hervortritt, wodurch Recht in Unrecht, Tugend in Easier 
iibergeht." [1:384]. , _c 
292 "[Ujber welches hinausgetrieben er haltungslos in sich zerfallt unter derselben Verlassung, 
welche bei nur anderem Umfange sein Gluck und Seine Stdrke ausmachte. [1.384]. 
293 "Die GrdBe ist die Beschaffenheit, an der ein Dasein mil dem Scheme von 
Unverfanglichkeit ergriffen und wodurch es zerstort werden kann." [1:384]. 
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Figure 22(a) 
The Abstract Measureless 
"The abstract measureless is the quantum as such which lacks an 
inner significance and is only an indifferent determinateness which does 
not alter the measure." 01\r' Here, in the realm of the 
Understanding, the abstract measureless "raises itself into a qualitative 
determinateness." (371)295 jhat quantitative change has no further bite 
is what makes the Measure measureless. But the Abstract Measureless 
"is equally a quality on its own account." (371)296 its quality is that it 
has no quality, in the sense of that which changes as a result of 
quantitative pressure.292 ^ 
The Abstract Measureless is a Specifying Measure, even it the 
Specified Measure is at first indifferent to it. "Thus there is posited the 
alternation of specific existences with one another and of these equally 
294 "Das abstrakte MaBlose ist das Quantum uberhaupt als in besmnungslos und als n 
leichgultige Bestimmtheit, dutch welche das MaB nicht verandert wird." [1:384- J. 
295 "[H]ebt sich zur qualitativen Bestimmtheit auf." [1:385]. 
296 "fElbenso einefflr sichseiendeQualitat." [1:385]. ^ • 
297 John Burbidge's account is far different. He seems to view the ^ „ 
bsolutely discontinuous qualities, conceived as distinct neutral compo^ds. 
'ROCESS, supra note 12, at 47. But this leaves out the whole notion of Substrate, which 
^ery point of the Nodal Line. Professor Burbidge then writes: 
Since there is no qualitative boundary the two [neutral compounds] share-at le^t 
to the extent that thought can anticipate it—they are simply external to each other So 
we are far removed from even a minimal account that would enable us to understand 
the relation. From this perspective no explanation is possible. We cannot conceive 
what is involved; it is immeasurable. . M „ as 
W. (footnote omitted). Thus, for Burbidge, what is immeasurahle is ^ at 48 
"The transformation of one quality into another is defined as immeasurable. . ™ 
oase There is nothing inconceivable about the Measureless. It represents the substohal 
Substrate which is immune from qualitative change through quantitative manipulation. It does 
not represent a property of qualitiative transformations. 
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with relations remaining merely quantitative—and so on ad infinitum.'" 
(371)298 Palpably this modulation describes the dialectical moment. 
Figure 22(b) 
Quality of the Abstract Measureless 
Hegel gives this new step no name other than the qualitative aspect 
of the Abstract Measureless. Once again, quality appears on the 
rightward side of the page—^the side of nothingness. 
In this alternation, [1] proclaims itself not qualitative. As such, [1] 
is immune to change from quantitative pressure. And by announcing 
what it is not, it shows what it is. [3] announces that it is not 
quantitative. Both of them export what they are not to [2]. Now 
Speculative Reason intervenes to name this activity. [2] is the 
Measureless (in its concrete form). This version of the Measureless is 
beyond Quality and Quantity. We are on the verge of bringing to a 
close the entire saga of Being. 
The name Hegel assigns to this speculative step is the Infinite For 
Itself: 
Figure 22(c) 
Infinite For Itself 
In and For Self. Hegel compares this new Infinite to the earlier 
versions. The most primitive Infinite was the Qualitative (or Spurious) 
Infinite. "The qualitative infinite, as simply a determinate being, was 
the eruption of the infinite in the finite as an immediate transition and 
vanishing of the latter in its beyond." (371-72)299 what the Spurious 
298 "[S]o ist die Abwechslung von spezifischen Existenzen miteinander und derselben ebenso 
mil bloB quantitativ bleibenden Verhaltnissen gesetzt,—so fort ins Unendliche." [1:385], 
299 "Die qualitative Unendlichkeit, wie sie am Dasein ist, war das Hervorbrechen des 
Unendlichen am Endlichen, als unmittelbarer Ubergang and Verschwinden des Diesseits in 
seinem Jenseits." [1:385], 
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Infinite in Quality lacked was continuity. In Figure 7(b), the Spurious 
Infinite went out of existence and became Another Finite.^®® The True 
Infinite, in contrast, continued on: it stayed what it was and became 
something different.^oi 
The Quantitative Infinite was more advanced. It had continuity. It 
expelled itself from itself, as did the Spurious Infinite. But, as it was by 
now a True Infinite, the Quantitative Infinite remained what it was 
while becoming something else.^®^ The Spurious Infinite was really Ae 
qualitative Finite, but it became the True Infinite. The Quantitative 
Infinite was already "in its own self its beyond and points beyond 
itself." (372)303 As a True Infinite, it was both inside and outside of 
itself. , , 
The Infinite For Itself, in contrast, "posits both the qualitative and 
quantitative as sublating themselves in each other. (372)30"' In short, 
the Infinite For Itself represents Measure returned to itself, and, in this 
reflection-into-self, the Infinite For Itself shows itself to be dehors the 
realm of Being. . . 
The Infinite For Itself is beyond the concept of qualitative change. 
Qualitative change depended upon quantitative change, which was in 
the realm of the extemal. So long as Measure is open to quantitative 
and hence to qualitative change, it is slave to something extemal ^not 
yet free. Yet the Abstract Measureless, as pure externality, sublated 
itself. It converted itself into Quality, and then into "that which is 
determined in and for itself." (372)305 
Here is the concept of "in and for self." This concept will become 
the very essence of the Doctrine of Essence on whose doorstep we now 
tentatively hesitate. Being-in-itself was mere implicitness. The job of 
the in-itself was to become for itself. Being-for-self as such expelled its 
content and became Quantity. Quantity had to recapture its Quality in 
order to have tme subsistence. But the spectre of qualitative change still 
portended an inability to subsist.306 Only when Quality and Quantity 
are both sublated can the thing have self-subsistence. The state that is 
beyond quantitative and qualitative transition is being-in-and-for-self. 
"This unity which thus continues itself into itself in its altemating 
300 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 535-36. 
301 Mat 541. 
302 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2079-80. 
303 "[Slein Jenseits an ihm selbst und weist Uber sich hinaus." [1:385]. ^ . j " 
304 "[S]etzt ebensowohl das Qualitative wie das Quantitative als sich ineinander aufhebend. 
[1:385]. 
305 "[D]as an und fur sich Bestinuntsein." [1:385]. 
306 This moment of Measure is described by one commentator as follows: "[t]he precise nature 
of 'measure' is shown to be that of superseded externality which constitutes totality in tot it 
reinstates the sublated being-for-self.... [M]easure has still to be regarded as an externality, a 
more or less, the determination of the concrete truth of finite being." Ferrmi, supra note 27, at 
33-4. 
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measures is the truly persisting self-subsistent material substance or 
thing." (372)307 
Positing. Hegel now makes three propositions about the Infinite 
For Itself. The first is qualitative. The second is quantitative. The third 
is the beyond of these concepts. 
(a) There is now posited a "perennial substrate" that underlies all 
qualitative change. (372)308 This is a "severance of being from its 
determinateness." (372)309 This severance began in Qunatum. In 
Quantity, generally, "a thing is indifferent to its affirmative 
determinateness." (372)3io it cares not what content is attributed to it by 
the will of the mathematician. This was the Qualitative Something of 
the Quantum.3'1 in Measure, this Substrate is in unity with its Quantity 
and Quality—as [4, 5, 6] in Figure 22(c) illustrates. Each of these 
moments is the beyond of the other. Their middle term is the Substrate 
which is the beyond of them both. The Substrate is thus a True Infinity. 
It goes out of itself and gets externally measured. But in doing so, it 
remains within itself and hence beyond all Measure [7]. 
(B) The Measures in which the Substrate manifests itself are 
"qualitative self-subsistent measures." (372) Nevertheless the 
difference between the Substrate and these Measures is quantitative 
only. That is, the Substrate is continuous with them. 
(y) The Substrate negates both its qualitative and its quantitative 
moments. Now the qualitative is quantitative in so far as the Substrate 
is concerned. The Substrate [7] is the name for the constant modulation 
between Quantity and Quality, "and the meaning of this process is only 
to show or to posit the determinate being" of the Substrate. (373)3i2 
"Consequently, the measures and the self-subsistent things posited with 
them are reduced to states. The alteration is only change of a state, and 
the subject of the transition is posited as remaining the same in the 
process." (373)3i3 
Let us pause to note a transition in the meaning of the crucial word 
"positing." We saw that, in the realm of Quality, things "were posited" 
by an external consciousness.By and large, concepts did not posit 
themselves. Now, the Infinite For Itself manifests itself in its 
307 "Diese so sich in ihrem Wechsel der MaBe in sich selbst kontinuierende Einheit ist die 
wahrhaft bestehen bleibende, selbstandige Materie, Sache." [1:385]. 
308 "Grundlage in ... als perennierend." [1:385], 
309 "[D]ies Abtrennen des Seins von seiner Bestimmtheit." [1:385]. 
310 "[G]roB ist etwas als gleichgultig gegen seine seiende Betsimmtheit." [1:385]. 
311 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2075. 
312 "[U]nd der Sinn dieses Prozesses ist nur das Dasein, das Zeigen oder Setzen, daB 
demselben ein solches Subtrat zugrunde liegt." [1:386]. 
313 "Damit sind die MaBe und die damit gesetzten Selbstandigkeiten zu Zustanden 
herabgesetzt. Die Veranderung ist nur Anderung eines Zustandes, und das Ubergehende ist als 
darin dasselbe bleibend gesetzt." [1:386]. 
314 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 483-84. 
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Determinate Being, but remains beyond it. Here is positing as sueh. It 
represents the concept armouncing what it is not. And by announcing 
this, it announces what it is. 
This appearance of true positing will generate a change in our 
standard convention. In the realm of Being, the Understanding focused 
on what is. The focus was always leftward—the side of being. In 
Essence, the shift will be rightward. Now it is posited that Essence is 
what is not. It is not what appears externally. 
Summary. Hegel now summarizes the progress across Real 
Measure. At first, in Specific Quantity, the extremes were not yet self-
sufficient Measures. Only the middle term was a Measure. Then, in 
Ratio of Measures, the extremes became overt Measures in themselves. 
In Elective Affinity, Measure was revealed to be a series of 
Measures. The thing was metonymic. The thing "shows itself to be an 
immanent specifying unity of a, self-subsistent measure distinguished 
from its specifications." (373)3'^ But it is still a slave to externality. 
[I]t is not yet the free Notion which alone gives its differences an 
immanent determination: it is as yet only a substrate, a material, and 
for its differentiation into totalities, i.e., into difference embodying 
the nature of the unchanged substrate, it is dependent solely on the 
external, quantitative determination which shows itself at the same 
time as a difference of quality. (373-74)^'® 
What the Measureless must now do is escape this dependence on 
extemality altogether. 
III. THE BECOMING OF ESSENCE 
Your inside is out! 
Your outside is inP^^ 
Logic has posited a substrate that is beyond Quality and Quantity, 
but we are not yet ready to slam shut the book of Being. There is first 
the very short third chapter of Measure which previews the nature of the 
inquiry in the Doctrine of Essence. The point of this chapter is to show 
315 "[Z]eigt sich zwar als immanente spezifizierende Einheit eines ftirsichseienden MaBes 
unterschieden von seinen Spezifikationen." [1:387]. 
316 "[N]och nicht der freie Begriff, welcher allein seinen Unterschieden immanente 
Bestimmung gibt, sondem das Prinzip ist zunachst nur Substrat, eine Materie, flir deren 
Unterschiede, um als Totalitaten zu sein, d.i. die Natur des sich seibst gleichbleibenden Substrats 
in sich zu haben, nur die auBerliche quantitative Bestimmung vorhanden ist, die sich als 
Verschiedenheit der Qualitdt zugleich zeigt." [1:387]. 
317 xhe Beatles, Everybody's Got Something to Hide, 'Cept for Me and My Monkey, in THE 
WHITE ALBUM (1969). 
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that external Measure is now internal to the Substrate.^'^ For this 
reason, "measure is always the measure of a thing . .. , of a persistent, 
self-sufficient material."^ 
The Understanding makes the first move. It contemplates the 
Infinite For Itself and proclaims its principle to be Absolute 
Indifference; 
Hegel begins the discussion of Absolute Indifference by 
characterizing some aspects of Being and Pure Quantity. Being, Hegel 
says, is "abstract equivalence ... in which there is supposed to be as yet 
no determinateness of any kind." (375)^20 would appear to refer to 
Pure Being, before otherness was invoked to establish Determinate 
Being. "Abstract equivalence" therefore refers to self-identity, of which 
Hegel was a huge critic. The self-identical being that "is" is 
"indifferent" to otherness. But ironically, that same entity was "not 
d i f f e r e n t " o t h e r n e s s .  
In Quantity, the thing is indifferent in both senses of "indifferent 
318 According to another summary of this chapter: "everything manifests itself extemally, it 
being of its very essence to do so. Its indifference to this external self-manifestation is, therefore, 
only opposed in a relative manner to its identity with it. The distinction of quantity and quality 
constitutes a relative opposition which expresses an absolute identity." Fleischhacker, supra note 
4, at 221. 
319 HAAS, supra note 216, at 158. 
320 "[A]bstrakte Gleichgultigkeit,—wofilr, da sie flir sich als Sein gedacht werden soil, der 
Ausdruek Indifferenz gebraucht worden ist,—an der noch keine Art von Bestimmtheit sein soil." 
[1:387-88]. 
A. Absolute Indifference 
Figure 23(a) 
Absolute Indifference 
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to" and "indifferent from." Thus, "pure quantity is indifferenee as open 
to all determinations provided that these are extemal to it and that 
quantity has no immanent connection with them." (375)^^' 
Absolute Indifference, however, is of a different sort. It is "the 
indifference which, through the negation of every determinateness of 
being, i.e., of quality, quantity, and their at first immediate imity, 
measure, is a process of self-mediation resulting in a simple unity." 
(375)^22 xhat is, the substrate is now posited as immune from extemal 
manipulation. Its extemal manifestations are merely its "state," which 
Hegel defines as "something qualitative and extemal which has the 
indifference for a substrate." (375)^^^ 
The state of the Substrate is qualitative, extemal, and "a vanishing 
determinateness." (375)^24 Heretofore, Quality has been the intemal 
integrity of the thing against quantitative manipulation. But now Quality 
has been extemalized. An extemalized intemality is a contradiction. 
"State" proclaims, therefore, that it is not the essence of Measure. 
Outward determinateness is now posited as "an empty differentiation." 
(375)^2^ The other—the inner life—is the tme thing. Nevertheless the 
inner is nothing without this outer. Therefore, "each of the two sides is 
posited as having to be itself in principle .. . this whole." (376)^2^ 
Absolute Indifference is to be taken as "concrete, a mediation-
with-self through the negation of every determination of being." 
"Concrete" implies a mediation between being and nothing.^^s 
It is the opposite of "abstract," and abstraction implies no indwelling 
Spirit. Now, the mediation between being and nothing, or between 
Quality and Quantity, is entirely within the selfhood of the thing. 
Extemalities no longer work any effect on the thing. The thing is 
beginning to taste freedom. Thus, "[a]s this mediation [the thing] 
contains negation and relation, and what was called state is its 
immanent, self-related differentiation." (375)^^^ "Contains" here must 
be read in the double sense of having it within and preventing it from 
escaping. Thus, the extemal is not tmly extemal but is the very 
321 "[D]ie reine Quantitat ist die Indifferenz als aller Bestimmungen fahig, so aber, dafl diese 
ihr auBerlich [sind] und sie aus sich keinen Zusammenhang mit denselben hat." [1:388], 
322 "[D]ie durch die Negation aller Bestimmtheiten des Seins, der Qualitat und Quantitat und 
deren zunachst unmittelbarer Einheit, des MaCes, sich mit sich zur einfachen Einheit vermittelt." 
[1:388], 
323 "[E]in qualitatives AuBerliches, das die Indifferenz zum Substrate hat," [1:388], 
324 "Verschwindendes," [1:388], 
325 "[E]in leeres Unterscheiden," [1:388], 
326 "[j]ede der beiden Seiten gesetzt ist, selbst an sich dies Ganze sein zu sollen," [1:389], 
327 "[D]as Konkrete, das in ihm selbst durch die Negation aller Bestimmungen des Seins mit 
sich Vermittelte," [1:388], 
328 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 457, 
329 "Als diese Vermittlung enthalt sie die Negation und Verhaltnis, und was Zustand hieB, ist 
ihr immanentes, sich auf sich beziehendes Unterscheiden," [1:388], 
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manifestation of the Substrate. Because of this containment of external 
Measure, the thing "ceases to be only a substrate and in its own self on\y 
abstract." (375)^^'' 
In Figure 22(c), the Infinite For Itself reduced measure relations to 
a Measureless Substrate. There, each extreme denied that it was either 
the qualitative or the quantitative. Speculative Reason made of this 
negative activity "the indivisible self-subsistent measure [7]", which is 
"w/?o//y present in its differentiations [4, 5, 6]." (376)33i 
The Understanding then discerned Absolute Indifference in Figure 
23(a), or [7] -¥ [1]. Now it is the turn of Dialectical Reason to remind 
the Understanding of its history. It brings forth the ideal moment of 
mediation between Quantity and Quality, which is posited as being 
"within the indifference itself [2]. (375)"2 Accomplishment of this 
task, Hegel says, establishes the Being-for-self of the Substrate—or 
Essence. 
Dialectical Reason at first identifies the now-internal ratio [2] as 
the mediated truth of Absolute Indifference [1], and of course the very 
identification of [2] implies its difference from [1], and its isolation as 
[3]. If [2] is both sides of the suppressed Ratio of Measures, [3] at first 
views the sides as quantitative only. [3] stands over against [2], which is 
a "fixed measure." (376)233 fixed measure represents the 
qualitative limit to the quantitative Measures in the ratio. Together, the 
limit [3] and the ratio [2] are called the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors. 
And, incidentally, the fact that [3] limits [2] ends up being the very flaw 
in Absolute Indifference that prevents it from entering the heavenly 
kingdom of Essence. "Limit" stands for slavery to externally imposed 
difference. 
330 "[A]ufhort, nur Substrat und an ihr selbst, nur abstrakt zu sein." [1:388], 
331 "[DJas untrennbare Selbstandige, daa in seinen Unterschieden ganz vorhanden ist." [1:388]. 
332 "[A]n ihr selbst und sie damit als fursichseiend gesetzt ist." [1:388]. 
333 "[F]este Mafi." [1:389]. 
B. Indifference as Inverse Ratio of Its Factors 
Figure 23(b) 
Inverse Ratio of Its Factors 
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Inverse Ratio is a term developed at the end of QuantityAn 
example of Inverse Ratio was xy = 16. In this expression, an increase in 
X led to a decrease in y. The variables x and y were quite open to 
external manipulation by the mathematician. But there was a limit to 
the mathematician's power over x and y. The mathematician could not 
make either x or y into zero. This resistance was important in re­
establishing Quality as integral to Quantum.^^^ 
An aspect of Inverse Ratio was that the exponent—16—stayed 
fixed—through the will of the mathematician. Now, the fixed measure 
has become Absolute Indifference to Measure and hence immunity from 
the external will of any mathematician or measurer. Hegel describes the 
difference between the primitive and more advanced Inverse Ratios as 
follows: "here the whole is a real substrate and each of the two sides is 
posited as having to be itself in principle [an sick] this whole." (376)^^^ 
In other words, since externality is now sublated, everything happens 
internally within the Substrate. And, in addition, any given part is the 
Substrate. Hence, [2] is just as much the Substrate as [3] is. Relations 
are no longer relation between inside and outside. There are now only 
internal relations. 
In the interest of establishing the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as the 
internal moment of the Substrate, Hegel presents the ratio as a ratio of 
quantities. But we are not to think that the Substrate is therefore the 
sum of these quanta. Quantity here stands for the indifference of [3] to 
[2] and the perfect continuity of [3] with [2], "in such a manner that it 
[3] would not be in its own self a quantum or opposed in any way, 
either as a sum or even as an exponent, to other quanta." (376)3" in 
other words. Quantity stands for the externality of the Ratio of 
Measures [3], whose "abstract determinateness... falls into 
indifference." (376)338 point is to establish the Ratio of Measures 
as "posited in [the Substrate] as moments." (376)33^ 
In the original Inverse Ratio of Figure 17(b), x and y were 
inversely proportional. As x shrank in size, y grew. Is the Inverse Ratio 
of Its Factors likewise inversely proportional? Here Hegel wishes only 
to say that the Measures have a negative relationship to each other. 
Perhaps one way of restating Hegel's point is as follows: (1) a "thing" is 
a negative unity of its Measures with the unity being on the side of 
Essence and the Measures on the side of Being. (2) Since the totality of 
334 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2138-48. 
335 at 2142-45. 
336 "[D]a6 hier das Ganze ein reales Stibstrat, und jede der beiden Seiten gesetzt ist, selbst an 
sich dies Ganze sein zu sollen." [1:389], 
337 "[S]o, dafi sie nicht an ihr selbst Quantum ware und in irgendeiner Weise als Summe oder 
auch Exponent andem ... gegeniibertrate." [1:389]. 
338 "[A]bstrakte Bestimmtheit, welche in die Indifferenz fallt." [1:389]. 
339 "[U]m als Momente an ihr gesetzt zu sein." [1:389]. 
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Measures implies a metonymic thing, any externally imposed 
quantitative increase of one Measure implies the quantitative decrease 
of some other Measure. Otherwise, the thing does not remain the thing 
it was but becomes some "difflerent" thing. Yet, since we are holding 
the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors constant (just as we held 16 constant in 
the more primitive Inverse Ratio), the thing is not permitted to become a 
different thing. In short. Being is "limited" by the measureless thing. It 
is in a zero sum situation at this point. In this sense, then, the Inverse 
ratio of Its Factors is inverse. Any growth in the Logic now occurs 
beyond the realm of mere Being. 
Hegel at first presents the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as a 
quantitative ratio, but, as the sides of the ratio are Measures, they are 
likewise qualities. Suppose one of these qualities puts itself forth as a 
quality. Hegel suggests that the other side must surrender its quality 
and be merely quantitative. Apparently the point is that two qualities 
meet each other as "mere oppugnancies," in Shakespearean terms.^'*'' 
One must strike the other down. Thus, of the two qualities, Hegel says 
that "one of [them] is sublated by the other." (376)341 But they are 
unified in a ratio nevertheless. And, Hegel further says, "neither is 
separable from the other." (376)342 
This mysterious proposition will be illustrated by centripetal and 
centrifugal force, in the Remark that follows. There, we will learn that 
if, say, centripetal force is predominant, then the planet must fly into the 
sun, because centripetal force has bested centrifugal force and has 
sublated it as a quality. (The fact that this does not happen, Hegel says, 
testifies to the wrongness of the theory.) Yet, if centripetal 
predominates, it must likewise sublate itself. Once the planet flies into 
the sun, there can be no further centropetal force. Rather, centripetal 
and centrifugal force are obviously engaged in a zero sum relationship. 
Something internal to planetary movement—^not measurable by these 
forces—keeps the planet from flying into or away from the sun.343 
Externality by now is defeated, and everything is in everything 
240 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 130, act 1, sc. 3. 
341 "[D]eren eine durch die andere aufgehoben." [1:389]. 
342 "[V]on der andem untrennbar ist." [1:389]. 
343 There is a Twilight Zone episode on this. At first, the earth seems to be flying into the sun 
(centripetal force). The rich doctor abandons his dying patients and flies to northern Canada to 
preserve his life. The patients faint and are revived by the doctor. It appears the earth is now 
flying away from the sun. Everyone is freezing and the doctor is flying to Florida, which is 
rumored to be warmer. The lesson of the episode is that, when isolated, centripetal and 
centrifugal force obliterate the entire earth. Some measureless thing must be preserving the earth 
from destruction. 
As a child, watching this episode in true horror, it rather bothered me that no explanation is 
given why the earth hurtling toward the sun, should so perversely and all of a sudden, insist on 
hurtling away from the sun. But this is precisely Hegel's critique of the theories of planetary 
movement that depend on centripetal and centrifugal force. 
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else. "[Tjherefore eaeh side of the relation, too, contains both sides 
within itself and is distinguished from the other side only by a more of 
the one quality and a less of the other, and vice versa." (316^^'^ 
Nevertheless, because of universal interpenetration, the Specifying 
Measures "are thus at the same time posited as self-subsistent relatively 
to each other." This self-subsistence of the sides is a fault, 
however, that cannot carry over into the Doctrine of Essence. 
Hegel next emphasizes that the immediate reign of Specifying 
Measures over their other is terminated. The Inverse Ratio of the 
Factors is now mediated by Absolute Indifference, and the whole is now 
the ultimate most advanced Determinate Being. This Determinate 
Being, Hegel says, is a totality. It is both the outward appearance and 
the inner Essence of the thing. 
But the unity of the ratio is only an indifference. The Substrate is 
not expressly the unity that holds together the extemal outward 
appearances. Furthermore, the moments of the ratio "are not yet 
explicitly self-determined, i.e. are not yet determined as sublating 
themselves into a unity within themselves and through one another." 
(377)346 So far, the indifference of the unity is also indifferent toward 
itself. (This is progressive, but, as Hegel, will say in the next section, 
we must also see posited an indifference toward indifference—a 
negation of the negation.) 
Hegel now makes three propositions about the Substrate—"[tjhis 
self-subsistent measure as thus indivisible." (377)^"^^ These three points 
are three defects that are, respectively, qualitative (but in-itself), 
quantitative and contradictory in nature.^^s ((j) Because the Substrate is 
only ^'implicitly the totality, it possesses the determinatenesses which 
are sublated in it, only as groundlessly emerging in it." (377)^''^ That is 
to say, the implicit being of the Substrate and the real being of the Ratio 
of Measures are unconnected. The problem is that we do not have 
before us "the self-repulsion of the indifference." (377)^50 j^is will be 
identified by Speculative Reason in the next section. So far, "the 
indifference is not posited as self-determining but as being determinate 
and determined only externally." (377)^^' (J3) At this point, the Inverse 
344 "[j]ede der Seiten des Verhaltnisses enthalt daher ebenso sie beide in sich und ist nur durch 
ein Mehr der einen Qualitat und das Weniger der andem und umgekehrt underschieden." [1:389], 
345 "[Sjind so gegeneinander zugleich als selbstandig gesetzt." [1:390]. 
346 "[]Si]och nicht als fursichseiend, d.i. noch nicht an ihnen selbst und durcheinander sich zur 
Einheit aufhebend bestimmt sind." [1:390]. 
347 "Dies so ruitrennbare Selbstandige ist nun naher zu betrachten." [1:390]. 
348 These three remarks parallel the qualitative, quantitative and eontradictory observations 
made at the end of Real Measure. See supra text accompanying notes 306-13. 
349 "[A]n sich die TotalMt, bleibend die Bestimmtheiten, welche in ihr aufgehoben sind, nur 
grundlos an ihr hervortretend." [1:390]. 
350 "[A]ls das AbstoBen ihrer von sich selbst." [1:390]. 
331 "[S]ie nicht als selbstbestimmend, nur als auBerlich bestimmtseiend und 
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Ratio of Its Factors is "in an inverted quantitative relation." (377)^^2 
The Measures are involved in "a to and fro in the scale of magnitude." 
(377)35^ It is not, however, Absolute Indifference that generates this 
modulation. The external measurer is at work in generating this 
activity. That is to say, given the substrate and given the stableness of 
the state or outward measure of the substrate, and further given a change 
in one of the infinite outward measures of the substrate, the substrate 
stays what it is only if, externally, some other measure is adjusted to 
prevent qualitative change in the substrate. "The principle of 
determination resides not in the indifference, but in something lying 
outside it." (378)^^"^ Or, in other words, the alteration is "for us" and 
therefore the result of mere external reflection.^^^ This is not good 
enough, (y) The sides of the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors, as well as the 
Absolute Indifference that unifies them, are each subsistent. Because 
each side is indifferent to the other side, "their determinate being is 
fi-eed from the transition of the qualitative sphere." (378)^5® In short, 
each side is immune from external control. Because this is so, and 
because each side also perfectly continues itself in the other side, we 
have a contradiction. How can each side be simultaneously continuous 
with (Quantity) and immune from (Quality) the other side? 
The Substrate, Hegel says, is dependent on the continuity of 
Quality into each side of the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors. "If the two 
qualities are self-subsistent—^taken, say, as if they were sensuous things 
independent of each other—then the whole determinateness of 
indifference falls asunder." (378)^5'^ Interpenetration must be complete, 
and, for this reason, the qualitative nature of each factor is precisely its 
quantitative continuity. If the qualities were only quanta, they would be 
external and "would reach beyond the other and would have in its more 
an indifferent determinate being which the other would not have." (378-
79)358 But such externality has been sublated. "From this," Hegel says, 
"it follows that [the factors] are in equilibrium-, that by as much as the 
one increases or decreases, the other likewise would increase or 
bestimmtwerdend." [1:390]. 
352 "[i]n umgekehrtem quantitativem Verhdltnisse." [1:390]. 
353 "[E]in Hin- und Hergehen an der Grdfle." [1:390]. 
354 "Es wird auf ein Anderes hingewiesen, das auflerhalb ihrer ist und in welchem das 
Bestimmen liegt." [1:390]. 
355 On the concept of "for us" and external reflection, see Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 
434-45. 
356 "[i]hr Dasein ist durch diese Gleichgilltigkeit dem Ubergehen des Qualitativen 
entnommen." [1:391]. 
357 "Sind beide Qualitdten selbstdndig,—etwa genommen wie voneinander imabhSngige, 
sinnliche Materien,—so fallt die ganze Bestimmtheit der Indifferenz auseinander." [1:391]. This 
fault is laid at Spinoza's doorstep in the Remark that follows. 
358 "[G]inge die eine tlber die andere hinaus und hatte in ihrem Mehr ein gleichgUltiges 
Dasein, welches die andere nicht hatte." [1:391]. 
196 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
decrease and in the same proportion." (379)359 xhese last two remarks 
relate to the zero sum quality of Being at this stage. There can be no 
quantitative surplus because this would also be a qualitative (or self-
identical) surplus. Yet, the qualitative surplus cannot exist separate and 
apart from its quantitative relation to other qualities.^^o 
There can be no question of quantitative surplus. "The more by 
which one of the eorrelated moments would exceed the other would 
only be a baseless determination." (379)3^' In other words, since the 
"thing" is metonymic, a quantitative surplus of any given measure is 
inconsistent with the truth of the thing and therefore impossible and 
meaningless. Being is logically in a zero sum situation at this point and 
therefore limited in the face of the "fixed measure." 
In the penultimate paragraph of this section, Hegel tries for a very 
subtle point. The Determinate Being of the factors (in their zero-sum 
mode) requires a distinct difference between Quality and Quantity. The 
complete interpenetration suggests that the Determinate Being of the 
factors vanishes. This point presupposes his Remark on centripetal and 
centrifugal force. This point will therefore be deferred until a 
description of Hegel's critique of these countervailing forces is 
provided. 
Meanwhile, Hegel concludes by saying that the dialectic unity in 
Figure 23(b) is "a contradiction in every respect." (379)3^2 Figure 23(b) 
"therefore has to be posited as sublating this its contradictory nature and 
acquiring the character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which 
has for its result and truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but 
that immanently negative and absolute unity which is called essence." 
(379)363 
1. Remark: Centripetal and Centrifugal Force 
Hegel pauses to comment on centripetal and centrifugal force in 
planetary orbits. The point, as usual, is that science has insufficiently 
distinguished between qualities and quantities. 
The last section described the "relationship of a whole which is 
359 "Hieraus folgt dies, dafi sie im Gleichgewicht sind, daB um soviel die eine sich vermehrte 
Oder verminderte, die andere gleichfalls zu- oder abn^hme und in demselben Verhaitnisse zu-
oder abnahme." [1:391-92]. 
360 It will be recalled that Quality as isolated ceased to be. See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, 
at 531-34. 
361 "Das Mehr, um welches das eine der in Beziehung stehenden Momente tlber das andere 
hinaus ware, wSre nur eine haltunglose Bestimmimg." [1:392]. 
362 "[D]er allseitige Widerspruch." [1:392]. 
363 "[S]ie ist somit so zu setzen, als dieser sich selbst aufhebende Widerspruch ziff 
fursichseienden Selbstandigkeit bestimmt zu sein, welche die nicht mehr nur indifferente, sondem 
die in ihr selbst immanent negative absolute Einheit zum Resultate und Wahrheit hat, welche das 
Wesen ist." [1:392]. 
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supposed to have its determinateness in the quantitative difference of 
two factors determined qualitatively against each other." (379)364 
relation is supposedly exhibited by the elliptical movement of the 
planets. Centripetal force is what draws the planets toward the center. 
Centrifugal force drives the planets away from the center. Their 
equilibrium is the elliptical orbit of the planet. 
These forces, Hegel implies, are not an example of Inverse Ratio of 
the Factors. Such a ratio is constituted by Specifying Measures which 
are complete unto themselves, indifferent to each other, yet diffused 
with Substrate. Instead, Hegel says, centripetal and centrifugal force are 
"only two qualities in inverse relation to each other." (379)365 
The inverse relation of centripetal and centrifugal force is 
supported by empirical fact, but, Hegel claims, the theory of centripetal 
and centrifugal force destroys the basic facts of astronomy. "[0]r if, as 
is proper," Hegel writes, "the fact is retained it escapes notice that the 
theory proves to be meaningless in face of the fact." (379-80)366 
Hegel refers to a well-known astronomic fact that planets in an 
elliptical orbit sweep equal areas with every increment of time.367 
Because the orbit is elliptical, this fact implies that "velocity is 
accelerated as they approach perihelion and retarded as they approach 
aphelion." (380)36^ Of this faet, Hegel writes: "[t]he quantitative 
side.. . has been accurately ascertained by the untiring diligence of 
observation, and further, it has been redueed to its simple law and 
formula. Henee, all that can properly be required of a theory has been 
accomplished." (380)369 
But for Hegel this is not enough. Theory assumes centripetal and 
centrifugal force are qualitative, opposed moments. Quantitatively, 
however, one increases and the other decreases, as the planets, in their 
evil mixture, pursue their orbits. At some point, the forces reverse 
themselves in their dominance, until the next tipping point is reached. 
"[Tjhis way of representing the matter," Hegel writes, "is 
contradicted by the essentially qualitative relation between their 
364 "Das Verhaltnis eines Ganzen, das seine Bestimmtheit in dem GroBenunterschiede 
qualitativ gegeneinander bestimmter Faktoren haben soil." [1:392]. 
365 "[N]ur zwei Qualitaten im umgekehrten Verhaltnisse zueinander." [1:392]. 
366 "[A]uf welche die in dieselbe gebrachte Theorie fiihrt, namlich das zugmnde liegende 
Faktum zu zerstdren oder, indem dieses, wie gehdrig, festgehalten wird, die Leerheit der Theorie 
gegen dasselbe darzutun." [1:392-93]. 
367 James W. Garrison, Metaphysics and Scientific Proof: Newton and Hegel, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 3, 8. 
368 "Geschwindigkeit beschleimigt, indem sie sich dem Perihelium, und sich vermindert, 
indem sie sich dem Aphelium nahem." [1:393]. Perihelion is the closest distance from the sim. 
Aphelion is the farthest. 
369 "Das Quantitative ... ist durch den imermtidliehen FleiB desBeobachtens genau bestimmt 
und dasselbe welter auf sein einfaches Gesetz und Formel zuruck gefiihrt, somit alles geleistet, 
was wahrhaft an die Theorie zu fordem ist." [1:393]. 
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respective determinatenesses which makes their separation from each 
other completely out of the question." (380)^^® Each of the forces only 
has meaning in relation to the other. Neither can exist on its own.^^' To 
say, then, that one of the forces preponderates over its fellow is to say 
that the preponderant force is out of relation with its fellow to the extent 
of the surplus. But this is to say that the surplus does not exist."2 
Hegel drives this point home; 
It requires but little consideration to see that if, for example, as is 
alleged, the body's centripetal force increases as it approaches 
perihelion, while the centrifugal force is supposed to decrease 
proportionately, the [centrifugal force] would no longer be able to 
tear the body away from the former and to set it again at a distance 
from its central body; on the contrary, for once the former has gained 
the preponderance, the other is overpowered and the body is carried 
towards its central body with accelerated velocity. (380-81)"3 
Only an alien force could save centrifugal force from being 
overwhelmed. And this is tantamount to saying that the force that 
guides the planets sans check cannot be explained. 
The transformation from weakness to strength of one or the other 
forces implies that "each side of the inverse relation is in its own self 
the whole inverse relation." (381)^24 predominant force implies its 
opposite, servient force. The servient force has not vanished. All that 
recurs then on either side is the defect characteristic of this inverse 
relation." (381)"5 Either each force is wrongly attributed a self-
identical existence free and clear of the other, "the pair being merely 
externally associated in a motion (as in the parallelogram of forces). 
(381)"6 Or neither side can achieve "an indifferent, independent 
370 "Dieser Vorstellung widerspricht aber das Verhaltnis ihrer wesentlich qualitativen 
Bestimmtheiten gegeneinander. Durch diese sind sie schlechthin nicht auseinanderzubringen. 
[1:393]. . ^ , 
371 This recalls Hegel's critique of calculus, where y or x were qualitative and meaningless 
outside the ratio y/x. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2082-138. 
372 This point is related to Hegel's general point that force can only be observed if opposed by 
another force. See generally Carlson, supra note 228. 
373 "Es ist eine sehr einfache Betrachtung, daB, wenn z. B. wie vorgegeben wird, die 
Zentripetalkrafl des Kdrpers, indem er sich dem Perihelium nShert, zunehrnen, die 
Zentrifiigalkraft hingegen um ebensoviel abnehmen soil, die letztere nicht mehr vermdchte, ihn 
der erstem zu entreiflen und von seinem Zentralkdrper wieder zu entfemen; im Gegenteil, da die 
erstere einmal das Ubergewicht haben soil, so ist die andere ilberwaltigt, und der Korper wird nut 
beschleunigter Geschwindigkeit seinem Zentralkdrper zugefuhrt. [1.394]. 
374 "[D]aB jede der Seiten des umgekehrten Verhaltnisses an ihr selbst dies ganze umgekehrte 
Verhaltnis ist." [1:394]. 
375 "Es rekurriert damit nur an jeder Seite das, was der Mangel an diesem umgekehrten 
Verhaltnis ist." [1:395]. . . 
376 "[U]nd mit dem bloB auBerlichen Zusammentreffen derselben zu einer Bewegung, wie im 
Parallelogramm der Krafle." [1:395]. The parallelogram of forces describes the phenomenon that 
if two forces exist as vectors, their average vector forms a parallelogram with the original vectors, 
provided one of the original vectors is multiplied by the imaginary number, -1. 
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subsistence in the face of the other, a subsistence supposedly imparted 
to it by a more." (382)^'^ 
The idea of intensity cannot help. "[TJhis too has its 
determinateness in quantum and consequently can express only as much 
force (which is the measure of its existence) as is opposed to it by the 
opposite force." (382)3''^ In other words, intensity is just a way of 
smuggling in the idea of the quantitative surplus, which is precisely not 
allowed because the Measures are in a zero siun relation at this point. 
In any case, the sudden shift from predominant to servient implies 
qualitative change. The increase in one implies the decrease of the 
other. 
The biological sciences had a like dilemma in the opposed forces 
of sensibility and irritability,^^^ but, Hegel writes: "the confused 
hotchpotch of nonsense in which it became entangled through the 
uncritical use of these determinations of the Notion soon led to the 
abandonment in these spheres of this formalism which, however, is 
practiced without restraint... in physical astronomy." (382)^^^ 
Vanishing. Just prior to this Remark, Hegel makes an argument 
that can now be more conveniently apprehended. Hegel has said in the 
Remark that, if centripetal force were predominant, nothing can explain 
why this force would not sublate centrifugal force once and for all, 
causing the planet to fly moth-like into the sun. Hegel indicates in the 
penultimate paragraph of the prior section that, in Maeasure generally, 
this sublation must logically occur. Furthermore, since the qualities in 
the Inverse Ratio of the Factors cannot exist separate and apart from 
their quantitative relation to each other, the necessary sublation of 
Quality implies the sublation of Quantity. These being sublated, 
Measure implies the realm of Essence. "Each of these hypothetical 
factors vanishes, whether it is supposed to be beyond or equal to the 
other." (379)^^' Since Quality and Quantity there must be, the mere 
isolation of these, even in a perfect equilibrium, implies their sublation 
in general. This self-abolition of Quality and Quantity, Hegel 
comments paradoxically, "constitutes itself [as] the sole self-subsistent 
quality." (379)^^2 xhis argument, if valid, establishes [2, 3] in Figure 
377 "[K]eine ein gleichgUltiges, selbstandiges Bestehen gegen die andere erhalten kann, was ihr 
durch ein Mehr zugeteilt werden soilte." [1:395], 
378 "[D]a es selbst in dem Quantum seine Bestimmtheit hat und damit ebenso nur so viel Kraft 
aufiem kann, d. h. nur insoweit existiert, als es an der entgegengesetzten Kraft sich 
gegenuberstehen hat." [1:395], 
379 These refer to an organic thing's attraction to and repulsion from another thing, 
380 dem unkritischen Gebrauche dieser Begriffsbestimmungen verwickelte, hat hier zur 
Folge gehabt, dafi dieser Formalismus bald wieder aufgegeben worden ist, der . . , besonders der 
physikalischen Astronomie in seiner ganzen Ausdehnung fortgefuhrt wird," [1:396], 
381 "Jeder dieser sein sollenden Faktoren verschwindet ebenso, indem er fiber den andem 
hinaus, als indem er ihm gleich sein soil," [1:392], 
382 "[D]ieser also sich zum einzigen Selbstandigen macht," [1:392], 
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23(b) as an "inherent incompatibility with itself, a repelling of itself 
from itself." (384)383 xhis self-repulsion is the step that Speculative 
Reason identifies. 
But is the argument valid? My conclusion is yes. At the point 
where the argument is hazarded, the thing was metonymic. It was a 
negative unity of all the Measure relations that the thing has with all the 
other things in the world. The thing, being fixed, does not permit 
quantitative disequilibrium of the Measures. The mere attempt of any 
such surplus to manifest itself is self-destructive. Any such 
manifestation puts the surplus—a qualitative proposition in a lethal 
isolation from the thing. This self-identity is thus radically 
incommensurate with any other thing, including itself. Such an entity 
destroys itself by its very logic. What is left is the beyond of the realm 
of Being—Essence. 
Spinoza. Hegel concludes his Remark by returning to Spinozan 
substance. Absolute Indifference is its "fundamental determination," 
Hegel says. (382)38^ Every determination is posited as vanished before 
substance. Difference is introduced empirically, and the source of 
difference is the intellect.385 Being external, Spinozan difference is, in 
Hegelian terms, quantitative. "[T]he difference is not immanent in the 
indifference, for as quantitative it is rather the opposite of immanence." 
(3 83)386 Contrary to Spinoza, difference must be grasped qualitatively. 
Spinozan Substance, Hegel says, echoing a theme from the Subjective 
Logic, is not yet subject.387 in Spinoza's philosophy, "quantitative or 
qualitative determination falls apart... it is the dissolution of measure, 
in which both moments [should be] directly posited as one." (383)388 
C. Transition into Essence 
The final move in the Doctrine of Being is the move to Essence. 
383 "[D]ie Unvertraglichkeit ihrer mit sich selbst, AbstoBen ihrer von sich selbst." [1:397]. 
384 "[D]ie Grundbestimmung." [1:396]. 
385 For Spinoza, as interpreted by Hegel, intellect is "modal"—i.e., external to substance. See 
5i/pra text accompanying note 46. » i 
386 "[D]er Unterschied ist nicht ihr immanent, als quantitativer ist er vielmehr das Gegenteil 
der Immanenz." [1:396]. , > c 
387 xhat substance is subjeet is a key Hegelian slogan from the Phenomenology. See 
PHENOMENOLOGY, IWPRA note 34, at 10. • • J- A FI -
388 "[Q]uantitativer oder qualitativer Bestimmung auseinanderfSllt... sie ist die Autlosung 
des MaBes, in welchem beide Momente unmittelbar als eins gesetzt waren." [1:396-97]. 
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Figure 23(c) 
Essence 
"Absolute Indifference," Hegel says, "is the final determination of 
being before it becomes essence." (383)3^^ This must be read in the 
technical sense. The Understanding determines propositions. 
Dialectical Reason negates them by pointing out a contradiction 
between the determination and its history. Speculative Reason shows 
the unity between the two. Absolute Indifference is the final move of 
the Understanding—the final attempt by the Understanding to state 
what is. In our conventional mode of depicting the official moves in the 
Science of Logic, the Understanding shifted the middle term over to the 
left side of the page. This is the last such move. In the Doctrine of 
Essence the Understanding shifts the middle term over to the right, to 
explain what is not. 
Why is Absolute Indifference not yet Essence? Because "it still 
contains difference as an external, quantitative determination; this is its 
determinate being." (383)3^" Absolute Indifference is "only implicitly 
the absolute, not the absolute grasped as actuality." (383)39i Actuality, 
Hegel says, requires that the differences be posited as indifferent. The 
further step that is needed "is to grasp that the reflection of the 
differences into their unity is not merely the product of the external 
reflection of the subjective thinker, but that it is the very nature of the 
differences of this unity to sublate themselves." (384)^^2 
As will be shown in some future installment, actuality is precisely 
the self-sublation of appearances. Essence is actual—it manifests 
itself—when it fades away. 
Hegel identifies the unity (or Essence) of the existential differences 
as "absolute negativity." (384)^^^ This negativity is a truly radical 
389 "Die absolute Indifferenz ist die letzte Bestimmung des Seins, ehe dieses zum Wesen 
wird." [1:397]. 
390 "[D]en Unterschied als auBerlichen, quantitativen an ihr hat. Dies ist ihr Dasein." [1:397]. 
391 "[N]ur das ansichseiende bestimmt, nicht als das fursichseiende Absolute gedacht zu sein." 
[1:397]. 
392 "Was hier noch fehlt, besteht darin, daU diese Reflexion nicht die auBere Reflexion des 
denkenden, subjektiven BewuBtseins, sOndem die eigene Bestimmung der Unterschiedejener 
Einheit sei, sich aufzuheben." [1:3970]. 
393 "[A]bsolute Negativitat." [1:397]. 
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indifference. It is an indifference to Being, which is therefore an 
indifference to itself, and even an indifference "to its own indifference." 
(384)3^'' What we have is a truly indeterminate indifference, in the 
nature of Pure Quantity. Indeed, at the beginning of Essence, Hegel 
will confirm that, "[i]n the whole of logic, essence occupies the same 
place as quantity does in the sphere of being; absolute indifference to 
limit." (391)^^^ Essence is therefore a retum to Quantity, but in an 
enriched form. 
The determination of Absolute Indifference was "from every 
aspect a contradiction." (384)3^^ First, it is "in itself ihe totality in 
which every determination of being is sublated and contained." (384)^''^ 
Yet, it asserts the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as an externality. 
As thus the contradiction of itself and its determinedness,... it is the 
negative totality whose determinatenesses have sublated themselves 
in themselves and in so doing have sublated this fundamental one-
sidedness of theirs .... The result is that indifference is now posited 
as what it in fact is, namely a simple and infinite, negative relation-
to-self. (384)398 
That Essence is simple is portrayed in [7]. That it is infinite is to 
say that Essence goes outside of itself but remains what it is (though, 
now that extemality has been abolished, "outside" must be understood 
as really inside).399 That Essence is negative will be consistently shown 
394 "[GJegen ihre eigene Gleichgultigkeit." [1:397]. 
395 "Das Wesen ist im Ganzen das, was die Quantitdt in der Sphare des Seins war; die absolute 
Gleichgilltigkeit gegen die Grenze." [11:5]. 
396 "[N]ach alien Seiten als der Widerspruch gezeigt." [1:397]. 
397 "Sie ist an sich die Totalitat, in der alle Bestimmungen des Seins aufgehoben imd enthalten 
sind." [1:397]. 
398 "So der Widerspruch ihrer selbst und ihres Bestimmtseins, ihrer an sich sienden 
Bestimmung und ihrer gesetzten Bestimmtheit, ist sie die negative Totalitat, deren 
Bestimmtheiten sich an ihnen selbst tmd damit diese ihre Gnmdeinseitigkeit... aufgehoben 
haben. Gesetzt hiemit als das, was die Indifferenz in der Tat ist, ist sie einfache und unendliche 
negative Beziehimg auf sich." [1:397]. 
399 Hegel says in the Lesser Logic. 
In the sphere of Essence one category does not pass into another, but refers to another 
merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to our reflection on what takes 
place: but it is the special and proper characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, 
when some[thing] becomes another, the some[thing] has vanished. Not so in Essence: 
here there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to its other. The 
transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition: for in the passage of 
different into different, the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their 
relation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so is Nought. 
The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative. No doubt these possess the 
characteristic of Being and Nought. But the positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly 
in reference to the negative .... In the sphere of Being the reference of one term to 
another is only implicit; in Essence... it is explicit. And this in general is the 
distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate, 
in Essence everything is relative. 
LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 111 Remark. 
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by the Understanding, which from now on says only what things are 
not. That it is a relation and a relation to self is apparent in [4, 5, 6, 7] 
of Figure 23(c). 
What is the fate of expelled Being? These dejecta "do not emerge 
as self-subsistent or external determinations." (3 84)^00 They are borne 
by and retained as ideal moments of the essential thing. Furthermore, 
these materials "are only through their repulsion from themselves." 
(384)'*®' In other words, appearances are authentic to the Essence of the 
thing. But they are not what they are affirmatively. This is the now 
superseded error of the Understanding. Rather, these beings are "sheer 
positedness." (384)'*®^ A positedness, in Essence, will be what 
determinateness was in the realm of Being. It is a relation between the 
affirmative and the negative, with the understanding that affirmations 
are really negations of the negation invoked by Essence. 
Being has now abolished itself. It has, to paraphrase Romeo, cut 
off its own head with a golden axe and exiled itself to a negative 
beyond. And in this self-banishment, Hegel states that the 
presupposition, with which the entire Logic began, has sublated itself. 
Being turns out to be "only a moment of [Essence's] repelling." (385)'*®^ 
The self-identity for which Being strived so assiduously "is only as the 
resulting coming together with itself." (385)'*®'* Being is now Essence, 
"a simple being-with-self." (385)'*®^ 
CONCLUSION 
Hegel's theory of measure differs starkly from that which emanates 
from analytic philosophy, in that Hegel identifies Quality as a 
constituent part of Measure. According to one recent example, 
provided by Henry Kyburg: "[m]ost scientific theories—if one is 
willing to translate predicates into characteristic functions [i.e., 
universal truths] one could say all scientific theories—express relations 
among quantities. To test a theory or to apply it therefore requires 
measurement.'"*®® 
Kyburg's account reveals a sensitivity to the fact that empirical 
judgments might contradict mathematical maxims, yet the justification 
of these maxims is dogmatically asserted. There is, however, no 
400 "Die Bestimmungen als solche abgestoBene gehoren aber nun nicht sich selbst an, treten 
nicht in Selbstandigkeit oder AuBerlichkeit hervor." [1:398]. 
401 "[N]ur durch deren AbstoBen von sich sind." [1:398]. 
402 "Gesetzte, schlechthin." [1:398], 
403 "[N]ur ein Moment ihres AbstoBens ist." [1:398]. 
404 "[N]ur ist als das resultierende, unendliche Zusammengehen mit sich." [1:398], 
405 "[E]infaches Sein mit sich." [1:398]. 
406 HENRY E. KYBURG, THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 9 (1984). 
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definitional work on what quantity or quality Kyburg concerns 
himself with a theory of error to describe the gap between observation 
and axiomatic truth. But to put the problem in this way is to reinscribe 
the dogma of axiomatic truth as the ultimate criterion after all. 
For Hegel, the gap between judgment and background truth is 
constitutional. In the background is the very gap that analytic 
philosophy would subjectivize by attributing it to the observer. For 
Hegel, measurements cannot possibly be accurate, because any "thing" 
is, at its core, Measureless. There can be no question of correcting, 
once and for all, the errors of measurement. 
407 Kyburg seems to equate "quantity" with Hegelian Measure. Thus there are "kinds of 
quantities." M at 19. In general, the concept of "quantity" is treated as self-evident. Quantity at 
times seems to be nothing other than language stripped of its coimotative penumbra. Id. at 20 ("// 
it were the case that we could speak without a background fund of information and convention 
concerning the application of language, then it would be possible for us to develop notions of 
quantity analogous to those with which we actually operate."). 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains the first 69 steps in the Science of Logic. These steps are grouped 
in triads. The first triad—^bearing the label (a)—represents the simple, immediate proposition of 
the Understanding. The Understanding states what is. The left side of the drawing represents 
being and the right side of the page represents nothingness. Because Measure is overtly the unity 
of Quality and Quantity, the Understanding begins to see dialectically when Measure is finally 
reached. Nevertheless, it has an immediate view of this mediation. 
The second member of a triad—bearing the label (b)—is the dialectical step. It opposes 
what is not to what is. The portion of the circle marked [2] is contrasted with [1]—the 
Understanding's immediate proposition. Although [2] is always internal to [1, 2], Dialectical 
Reason generates [3]—itself an isolated, immediate, and hence defective claim. 
The final member of the triad—^bearing the label (c)—is the speculative step in which 
being and nothing are thought together. Within the speculative sphere [4-7], [7] represents a 
static immediate account of a dynamic process [4-6]. 
After the speculative step, the Understanding makes a one-sided proposition about the prior 
step. This is shown as the Understanding's dragging the prior figure over to the left side of the 
page—the side of affirmative being. 
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Figure 1 (a) 
Pure Being 
Figure 1 (b) 
Pure Nothing 
Figure 1 (c) 
Becoming 
Figure 3 (a) 
Something/Other 
Figure 3 (b) 
Being-for-Other and Being-in-ltseif 
Figure 3 (c) 
Determination of the In-ltseif 
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Figure 11 (a) 
Continuity 
Figure 11 (b) 
Discreteness 
Figure 11 (c) 
Enriched Quantity 
Figure 12 (a) 
Continuous Magnitude 
Figure 1 2 (b) 
Discrete Magnitude 
Figure 1 2 (c) 
Quantum 
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Figure 14 (a) 
Extensive Magnitude 
(Extensive Quantum) 
Figure 1 4 (b) 
Intensive Magnitude (Degree) 
Figure 1 4 (c) 
The Quality of Quantum 
Figure 1 5 (a) 
Intensive Magnitude (Degree) 
Figure 1 5 (b) 
Extensive Magnitude 
Figure 15 (c) 
Qualitative Something 
2003] HEGEL 'S THEORY OF MEASURE 211 
Figure 16 (a) 
Quantitative Something 
Figure 16 (b) 
Quantitative Infinite Progress 
Figure 16 (c) 
Infiniteiy Great and Infinitely Smail 
Figure 18 (a) 
Immediate Measure 
Figure 18 (b) 
Mediated Immediate Measure 
Figure 18 (c) 
Specifying Meosure 
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Figure 20 (a) 
Combination of Measures 
Figure 20 (b) 
Measure as a 
Figure 20 (c) 
Elective Affinity 
Figure 21 (a) 
Continuity of Affinity 
Figure 21 (b) 
nf AfTinitv (Fiiihstratel 
!21 (C) 
Nodal Line 
2003] HEGEL 'S THEORY OF MEASURE 
